It might appear that I have been going to some pretty extreme lengths to belabor the obvious: we live in a world populated by material objects made of atoms. Atoms exist in particular places at particular times and move around according to laws. Collections of atoms are called systems and the positions of atoms within a system are called states. Correlations between states are called information.
All this might look like I'm trying to dodge some of the hard problems, but in fact it's the exact opposite. I'm trying to set the stage for talking about one of the hard problems, namely, where does information come from? How is it created? For this question to even make sense we need a precise definition of what we are talking about, of what information actually is, which is why all this prep work has been necessary.
But we need more than just that, because not all information seems to be created equal. There are some kinds of information whose creation appears straightforward. For example, a thermometer contains information about the temperature of its surroundings. But there is no great mystery there. It's obviously just a straightforward natural process, though it turns out that this process is not quite as easy to describe as you might first suspect. Still, there is no need to invoke anything beyond the simple lawful behavior of atoms (and few odds and ends like electrons and photons) to explain thermometers and light switches and cameras and even computers. Thermometers and light switches and cameras and computers are all just Atoms Doing Their Thing (ADTT).
But there are two kinds of systems in nature that appear to be qualitatively different: DNA and human brains. Both of these contain information (obviously) but the information contained in DNA and human brains seems at first glance to be of a qualitatively different character than that contained in thermometers and light switches and cameras. But note well that I had to leave computers off that list. It is not at all clear any more whether human brains are qualitatively different from computers, or exactly what distinguishes the behavior of brains and computers, at least in terms of the information they contain. Up until a few years ago this was still a philosophical problem. There were legitimate-sounding arguments that there were things brains could do that computers could not, but these have all be utterly destroyed by technological progress over the last few decades. It was once argued that computers could never beat humans at chess, or speak Chinese, or distinguish dogs from cats. Just in my lifetime all of these things have gone from cutting-edge research to borderline trivial. A computer that will utterly crush any human at chess today costs a few hundred dollars and fits comfortably in the palm of your hand.
But, of course, computers would not exist without human brains to build them. Large Language Models would not work without a corpus of text generated by human brains to train on. And brains would not exist without DNA. So there still seems to be something special about DNA and brains, some quality that distinguishes them from thermometers and light switches and cameras.
What is this quality, where does it reside, and where does it originate? Where exactly does the hypothesis that everything we observe can be accounted for by Atoms Doing Their Thing fail?
One possibility is the capacity of the human brain for invention, for creating new information. LLMs can mimic the input-output behavior of brains, but only if they are first trained on a vast corpus of information that was produced by brains. All that information had to originate somewhere. The only possible source of that information, it would seem, is human brains, and specifically, some quality that brains have that computers lack for creativity and originality, for creating new and interesting information. What else could it possibly be?
Notice that I quietly snuck a new concept in there: new and interesting information. Creating information, that is, correlations between states of systems, is, as noted earlier, not hard. Even creating new information is not hard: just flip a coin and look at it. The information about which side landed up is new. It didn't exist before the coin landed. (Note that this might not actually be true, but that's a deep, deep rabbit hole, one which we will explore later. But for now let's just assume that it is not possible to predict the result of a coin flip, and so it really does produce new information.) But this information is obviously completely different than the kind of newness in an original novel or poem or invention. So it is not just newness that matters, it is something else, and that "something else" is what I call being interesting.
What exactly makes new information interesting? That question is even harder to answer than what makes something a chair, but it doesn't really matter. What matters is that humans mostly agree on what "interesting" means in this context, just like they mostly agree on what a chair is, and so this agreement is itself an observation that we need to explain. And eventually we will, but not just yet.
For now, let's just accept that humans seem to be able to recognize and (mostly) agree on some distinction between interesting and uninteresting information in much the same way that they can recognize and (mostly) agree on some distinction between chairs and non-chairs. This turns out to have surprisingly far-reaching and profound implications.
Consider someone named Audrey who writes an original poem or essay or novel, and a second person named Paul who makes a copy of Audrey's work and puts his own name on it. We call Audrey an Author and Paul a Plagiarist because Audrey has created new, interesting information and Paul hasn't.
But plagiarism is not limited to copying original work like poems and essays and novels. Consider a journalist (let's call her Jane) who writes news stories. Copying one of Jane's stories would also be considered plagiarism despite the fact that news stories are not original in the same sense that poems and essays and novels are. Indeed, the whole point of journalism is the exact opposite. The value of journalism is that the information it contains reflects objective facts and are not an invention of the author. So why is journalism considered valuable work? Why do news stories have by-lines? Why is copying a new story and re-publishing it under your own name considered plagiarism? Aren't news stories just facts? How can you claim ownership over a fact?
The answer is that yes, news stories are "just facts", but they are a very particular kind of fact. They are interesting facts. They are relevant facts. The value in journalism is not in the generation of the information -- that is done by current events. The value in journalism is in the filtering, the separation of the wheat from the chaff, the relevant events from the irrelevant details, the interesting from the uninteresting.
This idea of "filtering out" relevant and interesting things from irrelevant and uninteresting things will turn out to be absolutely crucial to our understanding of the world. It will turn out that everything can be understood in these terms, even the very existence of atoms, though it will be a long, long time before we get there. For now, I just want to point out that even the creation of original work like poems and novels and blog posts can be explained not as a phenomenon in its own right, separate from the kind of filtering that goes on in journalism, but as an instance of the exact same process.
I can tell you from personal experience that the contents of this blog did not spring fully formed into my mind. What you are reading now is the result of a filtering process. Before I write a single word, I have to do a lot of reading. I don't have the mental capacity to remember everything I read, so I have to filter out the relevant and interesting bits from the irrelevant and uninteresting bits. Then I start to kick around ideas for what to write about, and the same thing happens. Ideas pop into my head and I mentally sift through them thinking, "Nope, that's crap. Nope, that's crap. Nope, nope, nope... well, hmm, maybe..."
Then I write a draft, read it over, decide it's crap, throw it out, and write something different. I usually end up throwing out much more text than I actually publish. Right now, as I write these very words, there is a pile of text in this file that I wrote earlier but decided was crap after reading it over. I'm keeping it around just in case there turns out to be something salvageable in it, but most likely all of it is just going to get thrown out, never to been seen by any human eyes other than my own because, well, it's crap. The text I'm planning to discard is, as I write this, about twice as long as the text I'm currently planning to keep and publish, and God only knows how many bad ideas flitted through my head that never even made it to the keyboard at all.
And then, finally, after all that, after the reading and the writing and the rewriting and the re-rewriting, after at long last I click on the "publish" button, there is yet another filtering process that is performed by my audience (such as it is) where they -- you -- read what I wrote, decide if it has merit, and maybe, if I'm lucky, leave a comment, or recommend to someone else that they might want to read what I've written. Maybe, some day, if I am very, very lucky, my words might get the attention of an agent or a publisher, whose entire job is to filter out relevant and interesting information from the torrent being constantly generated by aspiring writers all over the world, the vast majority of whom are doomed to never have anything enter their brains that gets past anyone else's filter and thus sink into quiet obscurity in the good company of countless prior generations of aspiring authors.
In other words, what we think of as originality is actually just the result of a lot of sifting through crap to find the good stuff. Humans discover the good stuff, they recognize the good stuff, but they don't actually produce it. Originality comes not from being the first to generate a new idea, but being the first to recognize it and promulgate it. The actual generation of new ideas isn't the hard part. The hard part is the filtering, recognizing the good ideas.
Notice how much this explains. It explains why journalism is considered valuable work despite the fact that originality is antithetical to good journalism. It explains why editing is considered valuable work. It explains why people can make a living as literary agents and script readers. It explains why AIs can be so good at writing really bad prose. It explains why good ideas and good books and good blog posts are rare and can't just be generated on demand.
Now, this does not entirely eviscerate the notion that human brains are special, but it does take us down a peg. The thing that makes us special is no longer our ability to come up with new ideas, but simply to recognize good ideas, which seems not quite as wonderful and special and magical as coming up with them in the first place. But it still demands an explanation of how the filtering works, and why humans seem to be so much better at it than other animals. (Whether we will actually turn out to be better at it than computers remains to be seen.)
As a sneak preview, the answer to this question will turn out to be that the laws of physics have built in to them a kind of "ur-filter", the mother of all filters, which ends up filtering out our ability to filter out interesting information. Actually, there are two of these ur-filters. One of them is Darwinian natural selection, which is a filter for the ability of a system to make a copy of itself. And the second is something called quantum entanglement, which is a filter for the phenomenon of information itself. Entanglement is what produces correlations between systems. I have to emphasize that I do not expect you to believe any of this yet. To say that there are a lot of details still to fill in would be a colossal understatement. But sometimes it can help to follow the path if you know ahead of time where it is leading, even if the end is still very far off in the distance.
Thursday, June 04, 2026
Seeking God in Science part 9: Creating Information
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
Some of these points seem so simple and obvious, but I have never actually considered them before. I'm starting to see why they are important. It's a fascinating read. Each new installment is like opening up a Christmas present.
ReplyDeleteNow that you mention it, If Doubleday/Penguin Random House would publish Frank Tipler's "Physics of Immortality", it seems to me they should be doubly interested to have you write something for them. Though Tipler's books were kinda interesting, they were also terrible and there was really no point to any of them.
> Each new installment is like opening up a Christmas present.
DeleteWow, thank you! That is one of the nicest things anyone has ever said to me, and it really means a lot coming from a YEC.
> If Doubleday/Penguin Random House would publish Frank Tipler's "Physics of Immortality", it seems to me they should be doubly interested to have you write something for them.
Well, I hope so, but the reality is that getting a book published involves a lot more than just writing a good book. In fact, writing a good book is neither necessary nor sufficient. The thing that matters is persuading the publisher that your book will *sell*. Nowadays that turns a lot more on how famous you are than it does on the quality of your work.
So you haven't described what information is -- is it atoms, energy, something else?
ReplyDeleteCorrelations and "information" are not features the physical world possesses on its own. They are abstract patterns that human minds impose when we observe, model, and describe physical systems. The systems themselves are just particles and fields interacting according to physical laws. They don’t contain or traffic in "information" or "correlations" until a mind abstracts those regularities out of the raw goings-on.
> So you haven't described what information is
DeleteYes, I have: it is correlations among states of systems.
> is it atoms, energy, something else?
Something else: correlations among states of systems.
> Correlations and "information" are not features the physical world possesses on its own.
Yes, they are. States are features that the physical world possesses, and so correlations among those states are features that the physical world possesses.
> They are abstract patterns that human minds impose when we observe, model, and describe physical systems.
Yes, they are that too, because human minds are states of humans brains. (We'll get to that.)
> The systems themselves are just particles and fields interacting according to physical laws. They don’t contain or traffic in "information" or "correlations" until a mind abstracts those regularities out of the raw goings-on.
Yes, they do. If all human minds suddenly disappeared from the face of the earth, thermometers would still contain information about the temperature of their surroundings.
>So you haven't described what information is
DeleteYes he has! And it's consistent with everything he has been saying in these installments! Are you even serious???
@Ron:
ReplyDelete>If all human minds suddenly disappeared from the face of the earth, thermometers would still contain information about the temperature of their surroundings.
Consider we have a thermometer in a human-mind-free world. If that thermometer contains information, where is it? What is the mass of that information? Can that information cause anything to happen?
Or put another way: if we subtracted all of the information from that thermometer, would it change anything about it?
"Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions. They compress complexity by modeling relevant degrees of freedom, correlations, or functional mappings. These idealized models enable prediction and control when full microscopic simulation is impossible.
Such abstractions, however, do not alter the underlying physics -- they provide epistemic tools. Humans create an interpretive framework, but the patterns and constraints they describe are objective features of the system's state space and dynamics. For example, a crystal's atomic lattice, or the expansion of mercury inside a glass tube, exhibit reproducible behaviors independent of description.
Physical systems consist of concrete configurations of matter and energy governed by fundamental physical processes. These evolve deterministically or probabilistically according to initial conditions and interactions, without intrinsic need or reference to "information."
> Consider we have a thermometer in a human-mind-free world. If that thermometer contains information, where is it?
DeleteInformation doesn't have a location. The physical systems that contain information have locations, but the information itself, being merely correlations among states, doesn't have a location. As a matter of convention we can say that information is co-located with the physical system that contains it (e.g. this file is on that hard drive) but things can get considerably more complicated than that (e.g. a RAID array).
> What is the mass of that information?
Information is correlations among states. Correlations don't have mass (obviously).
> Can that information cause anything to happen?
Yes. Of course. If things are correlated, the results can be different than if they are not. Why would you doubt this?
> Or put another way: if we subtracted all of the information from that thermometer, would it change anything about it?
What does it mean to "subtract information" from a thermometer?
> "Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions. They compress complexity by modeling relevant degrees of freedom, correlations, or functional mappings. These idealized models enable prediction and control when full microscopic simulation is impossible.
That is sheer nonsense. You haven't defined what you mean by "model" or "abstraction" or "compress" or "complexity" or "relevant" or "degrees of freedom" or "functional mappings". Even your use of "correlations" is non-sensical because you haven't said what is being correlated.
> Such abstractions, however, do not alter the underlying physics -- they provide epistemic tools. Humans create an interpretive framework, but the patterns and constraints they describe are objective features of the system's state space and dynamics. For example, a crystal's atomic lattice, or the expansion of mercury inside a glass tube, exhibit reproducible behaviors independent of description.
So? What does any of that have to do with the scientific method? What Problem are you addressing? What observations does this help to explain?
> Physical systems consist of concrete configurations of matter and energy governed by fundamental physical processes. These evolve deterministically or probabilistically according to initial conditions and interactions, without intrinsic need or reference to "information."
You have lost the plot. The Problem being addressed is that there appears to be something out there in objective reality that humans call "information". This is analogous to the Problem that there seems to be something out there in objective reality that humans call "chairs". Some Christians think that in order to account for our observations of chairs we need to go beyond the material and posit the existence of some extra-physical Platonic "chairness". But we don't. All of our observations about chairs can be explained purely in terms of physical arrangements of atoms. It's the same with information. All of our observations about what humans talk about when they talk about information can be explained as correlations between states. If you want to dispute this, you have to provide a counter-example, an *observation* that cannot be explained this way.
> Some Christians think that in order to account for our observations of chairs we need to go beyond the material and posit the existence of some extra-physical Platonic "chairness".
DeleteWhenever I feel down, I just think about this and that debate you did with Slick and it really brings a smile to my day. Sometimes I start laughing out loud in public because of it. I'm laughing right now, actually. :D
>> Can that information cause anything to happen?
ReplyDelete>Yes. Of course. If things are correlated, the results can be different than if they are not. Why would you doubt this?
For our single thermometer in the world without humans, give me an example of what the information in that thermometer can cause to itself or its environment.
>> Or put another way: if we subtracted all of the information from that thermometer, would it change anything about it?
>What does it mean to "subtract information" from a thermometer?
You said the thermometer contained information. What if it didn't? How would that change the thermometer itself or its environment?
>> "Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions. They compress complexity by modeling relevant degrees of freedom, correlations, or functional mappings. These idealized models enable prediction and control when full microscopic simulation is impossible.
>That is sheer nonsense. You haven't defined what you mean by "model" or "abstraction" or "compress" or "complexity" or "relevant" or "degrees of freedom" or "functional mappings". Even your use of "correlations" is non-sensical because you haven't said what is being correlated.
Well, if you can't understand it because of your sudden amnesia over common terms of the art in mathematics and the sciences, how can you judge it as nonsense? Once your memory comes back, you'll find my comment highly insightful.
Also you spiked the universe's Irony Meter by demanding definitions after your post on Chairs.
>> Physical systems consist of concrete configurations of matter and energy governed by fundamental physical processes. These evolve deterministically or probabilistically according to initial conditions and interactions, without intrinsic need or reference to "information."
>You have lost the plot. The Problem being addressed is that there appears to be something out there in objective reality that humans call "information".
Humans create a representation of objective reality that has "information". Which is fine, humans do that a lot (create representations).
But you claim "information" exists even without humans.
>This is analogous to the Problem that there seems to be something out there in objective reality that humans call "chairs". Some Christians think that in order to account for our observations of chairs we need to go beyond the material and posit the existence of some extra-physical Platonic "chairness".
I don't know why you mention Christians in this context. First, Plato was a pagan. Second, there are a lot of Christian anti-realists. While "some" (nice qualifier you used) Christians would be realists, I would posit that "most" don't think about it at all.
>But we don't. All of our observations about chairs can be explained purely in terms of physical arrangements of atoms. It's the same with information. All of our observations about what humans talk about when they talk about information can be explained as correlations between states.
So ... "information" is like "chairness" -- and "chairness" we don't need? So then we don't need information, either? Now you're confusing me.
>If you want to dispute this, you have to provide a counter-example, an *observation* that cannot be explained this way.
I think you need to provide an explanation of why adding "information" to a physical system is needed to explain that physical system at all. Can't the physical system just be explained via our physical laws -- quantum mechanics, gravity, electromagnetism? Why postulate a massless, spaceless extra ingredient called "information"?
Delete> For our single thermometer in the world without humans, give me an example of what the information in that thermometer can cause to itself or its environment.
This depends on what you mean by the word "thermometer". You need to go back and review Part 2 of this series.
"Thermometer" generally refers to an artifact, i.e. a thing made by humans. That kind of thermometer in a world without humans is a counterfactual, so the example you seek requires either a suspension of disbelief or a change in the definition of "thermometer". For example, does a snowflake count as a thermometer? It certainly contains information about the temperature of its environment, specifically, the existence of a snowflake indicates that the temperature of its environment is below freezing. So I could tell you a story of a thermostat that continues to operate after the apocalypse, or a snowflake that melts and triggers an avalanche, or something like that.
> You said the thermometer contained information. What if it didn't?
That is another counterfactual.
"Containing information" is a metaphor. Saying that a system X "contains information" is just another way of saying that X is in a state that is correlated with some other state. Those words mean exactly the same thing. Containing information is completely different from containing something material, like a box containing the things inside it. The only difference between (say) a hard drive that "contains" a file and one that doesn't is its state.
>> That is sheer nonsense. You haven't defined what you mean by "model" or "abstraction" or "compress" or "complexity" or "relevant" or "degrees of freedom" or "functional mappings". Even your use of "correlations" is non-sensical because you haven't said what is being correlated.
> Well, if you can't understand it because of your sudden amnesia over common terms of the art in mathematics and the sciences, how can you judge it as nonsense? Once your memory comes back, you'll find my comment highly insightful.
Dial back the snark or I will stop publishing your comments.
If you say that you are using terms of art, then all of your claims are just flat-out wrong. For example: ""Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions." Um, no, it isn't. This is Christian apologist rhetoric designed to obfuscate and mislead, and it would get you laughed out of the room in any technical setting.
> Also you spiked the universe's Irony Meter by demanding definitions after your post on Chairs.
Second warning: dial back the snark.
I have no idea what you mean. The *whole point* of the "chair" example was to show that some words, even ones where everyone thinks they know what they mean, don't actually have crisp definitions. That is exactly why I demand definitions from you, because when you try to provide them you will realize that some of the words you are using don't have crisp definitions even though you think they do.
> Humans create a representation of objective reality that has "information". Which is fine, humans do that a lot (create representations).
I would phrase this as: human brains contain information. It does not follow that human brains are the only things that contain information. Where this is all leading is that there is nothing special about human brains. There is no distinction between the information contained in a human brain or the information contained in a chimpanzee brain or an elephant brain or a hard drive or a book or DNA or even a thermometer. The only difference is that brains typically contain a lot *more* information than thermometers.
> But you claim "information" exists even without humans.
DeleteYes. Exactly. And the easiest way to see that is to observe that animal brains contain information too. So it's not *human* brains that are (potentially) special, it's brains in general. But books can also contain information, and books don't have brains. But books are *made* by (things with) brains so maybe brains are still necessary. Except that ice cores and fossils and sedimentary layers also contain information, and those form without any brains at all.
>> This is analogous to the Problem that there seems to be something out there in objective reality that humans call "chairs". Some Christians think that in order to account for our observations of chairs we need to go beyond the material and posit the existence of some extra-physical Platonic "chairness".
> I don't know why you mention Christians in this context. First, Plato was a pagan.
Because I've heard more than one Christian apologist argue that Platonic ideals necessarily exist and that these are evidence for God.
> Second, there are a lot of Christian anti-realists. While "some" (nice qualifier you used) Christians would be realists, I would posit that "most" don't think about it at all.
I don't know what to tell you. I first learned about all this from Matt Slick. Maybe you should ask him.
>> But we don't. All of our observations about chairs can be explained purely in terms of physical arrangements of atoms. It's the same with information. All of our observations about what humans talk about when they talk about information can be explained as correlations between states.
> So ... "information" is like "chairness" -- and "chairness" we don't need? So then we don't need information, either? Now you're confusing me.
We don't need "chariness" but we do need "chair" because "chair" is necessary to explain the observation that people talk about chairs and talk about sitting in chairs. We don't need "chairness" to explain this. All this talk of chairs can be understood in terms of the arrangements of atoms, i.e. in terms of systems and states.
We need *something* to explain the observation that people talk about information, that they have intuitions about it. But, just as with chairs, it turns out we can explain this without having to add anything to our ontology. Information, just like chairs, can be understood in terms of systems and states.
>> If you want to dispute this, you have to provide a counter-example, an *observation* that cannot be explained this way.
> I think you need to provide an explanation of why adding "information" to a physical system is needed to explain that physical system at all. Can't the physical system just be explained via our physical laws -- quantum mechanics, gravity, electromagnetism?
Yes. Exactly.
> Why postulate a massless, spaceless extra ingredient called "information"?
It's not an "extra ingredient". It's the same old ingredients. The only new thing is this idea of "correlation", but that is not an addition to the *ontology*, it's just a mathematical definition.
>"Thermometer" generally refers to an artifact, i.e. a thing made by humans. That kind of thermometer in a world without humans is a counterfactual, so the example you seek requires either a suspension of disbelief or a change in the definition of "thermometer".
ReplyDeleteYou're the one who came up with the thermometer scenario. Let's review:
> If all human minds suddenly disappeared from the face of the earth, thermometers would still contain information about the temperature of their surroundings.
So what did you mean by it?
>So I could tell you a story of a thermostat that continues to operate after the apocalypse, or a snowflake that melts and triggers an avalanche, or something like that.
There you go - one way we could have thermometers on an earth without humans is if all of the humans died after building the thermometers.
So give me an example of how the information contained within a thermometer can cause anything to happen after an apocalypse. Note in your statement above you said it "would still contain information." Which you have said is without mass and has no defined location. My final question is probing whether the information contained within the thermometer has any causal power.
You previously responded that yes it did:
>Yes. Of course. If things are correlated, the results can be different than if they are not. Why would you doubt this?
I would like an example. As I have doubts that it has any causal power.
>> You said the thermometer contained information. What if it didn't?
>That is another counterfactual.
Then approach it this way: I claim the thermometer contains no information. Provide me with evidence that it does.
But I think we're getting somewhere:
>> But you claim "information" exists even without humans.
>Yes. Exactly.
... which would seem to be saying that "information" must exist in the objective, physical world ...
>> Can't the physical system just be explained via our physical laws -- quantum mechanics, gravity, electromagnetism?
>Yes. Exactly.
... which would seem to say that "information" doesn't exist in the physical world ...
>> Why postulate a massless, spaceless extra ingredient called "information"?
>It's not an "extra ingredient". It's the same old ingredients. The only new thing is this idea of "correlation", but that is not an addition to the *ontology*, it's just a mathematical definition.
... which would seem to say that "information" doesn't exist in the physical world ... and "information" is just ideas in human brains. Eliminate all humans, and you would eliminate all of the "information" ideas in them.
But then we have a contradiction: your claim that "information" exists even without human brains.
I'm really not trying to trick you, or trap you in any way. I've been interested in the ontological status of "information" and perhaps you have some insight into it. So I just want to know what you mean by "information" -- you often write about it like it was a caloric substance that moves around. Is that just a convenient metaphorical shorthand, or does "information" have some sort of existence in the physical world?
I’m genuinely trying to understand the ontological status you assign to information. Is it purely a descriptive or mathematical convenience with no deeper reality, or does it refer to something that exists in the world independently of how we talk about it?
Thanks.
Delete> I’m genuinely trying to understand the ontological status you assign to information.
That's hard for me to believe. You have been trolling my blog for years. But OK, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt for now.
The TL;DR answer to this question is that information is in its own ontological category, separate from material objects.
> Is it purely a descriptive or mathematical convenience with no deeper reality, or does it refer to something that exists in the world independently of how we talk about it?
This question is chock-full of unwarranted assumptions. It assumes that a "mathematical convenience" and "deeper reality" are mutually exclusive things. It assumes that "existence in the world" is a binary attribute, and that it is independent of how we talk about things. Neither of these is necessarily true. Is a broken chair a chair? Is Pluto a planet?
What is really going on out there in the world is that atoms move around and arrange themselves in certain configurations, and then we humans attach labels like "chair" and "planet" to some of those configurations. When we attach those labels, that act of labelling doesn't change the configuration that the label refers to in any way.
> So give me an example of how the information contained within a thermometer can cause anything to happen after an apocalypse.
See, this is why I have a hard time believing that you really want to understand this stuff. The fact that you would ask this indicates that you have not thought about it *at all* because it's really easy to contrive a scenario. A thermostat is a device that causes things to happen depending on the information in a thermometer (which is part of the thermostat) and thermostats work whether or not there are humans around. That's the whole point of a thermostat.
> Then approach it this way: I claim the thermometer contains no information. Provide me with evidence that it does.
Again, it is hard for me to believe that you are really advancing this argument in good faith. Do you really deny that a thermometer contains information about (the temperature of) its environment? What do you think the word "thermometer" *means*???
> "information" is just ideas in human brains.
No. Information is correlations among states. Ideas in brains are examples of information, but they are not the only examples.
> Eliminate all humans, and you would eliminate all of the "information" ideas in them.
Your thinking is so muddled I don't even know where to begin. Yes, if you eliminated all humans you would eliminate all human brains and so you would eliminate all the information contained in human brains (obviously). But you would not eliminate all the information contained in animal brains and other physical systems.
> I'm really not trying to trick you, or trap you in any way.
Again, I don't believe you, because:
> I just want to know what you mean by "information"
That is clearly untrue because I've already told you again and again: information is correlations among states of physical systems. Obviously you want something more than that or we would not be having this conversation.
> you often write about it like it was a caloric substance that moves around. Is that just a convenient metaphorical shorthand, or does "information" have some sort of existence in the physical world? I’m genuinely trying to understand the ontological status you assign to information. Is it purely a descriptive or mathematical convenience with no deeper reality, or does it refer to something that exists in the world independently of how we talk about it?
Heat is actually a very good analogy. We can talk about heat "moving from place to place" even though heat is not a substance, it is just a kind of motion. Likewise we can talk about information moving from place to place even though information is not a substance.
>You have been trolling my blog for years.
ReplyDeleteActually, I haven't. Try to wrap your head around that.
>What is really going on out there in the world is that atoms move around and arrange themselves in certain configurations, and then we humans attach labels like "chair" and "planet" to some of those configurations. When we attach those labels, that act of labelling doesn't change the configuration that the label refers to in any way.
Which appears to be saying that "information" is just a human idea.
>> So give me an example of how the information contained within a thermometer can cause anything to happen after an apocalypse.
>See, this is why I have a hard time believing that you really want to understand this stuff. The fact that you would ask this indicates that you have not thought about it *at all* because it's really easy to contrive a scenario. A thermostat is a device that causes things to happen depending on the information in a thermometer (which is part of the thermostat) and thermostats work whether or not there are humans around. That's the whole point of a thermostat.
You've changed from "thermometer" to "thermostat". Ok, let's go with that.
Here is a description of a mechanical thermostat that uses a bimetallic coil to regulate temperature: Ambient air consists of a large population of molecules whose velocities follow the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. The average translational kinetic energy per molecule stands in direct proportion to the absolute temperature. Molecules impinge repeatedly upon the outer surface of the coiled bimetallic strip, transferring both linear momentum and kinetic energy to the atoms that form the strip’s two bonded metallic layers.
Each layer is a crystalline lattice of atoms whose mutual separations are maintained by electromagnetic interactions between nuclei and their surrounding electron clouds. When kinetic energy is absorbed from the colliding air molecules, the atoms increase the amplitude of their thermal vibrations about lattice sites. The interatomic potential energy surface is anharmonic; therefore the time-averaged distance between neighboring atoms grows with rising vibrational energy. The two metals possess different atomic numbers, electron configurations, and equilibrium lattice spacings, so they undergo unequal expansions under identical thermal excitation. The mismatch in elongation produces shear strain across the bonded interface. In the coiled geometry this strain appears as a torque that rotates the free end of the coil through an angle determined by the integrated thermal history of the lattice.
An electrical contact fixed to the moving end of the coil is carried along by the rotation. When the contact meets the opposing stationary terminal, a metallic junction of low resistance is formed. With a voltage applied across the circuit, conduction electrons flow through the junction and along the connecting wires, producing a macroscopic electric current. This current may energize the winding of a relay solenoid. The current in the solenoid creates a magnetic field whose Lorentz force displaces a ferromagnetic armature, thereby closing a higher-capacity switch. Closure of the power circuit then activates the heating or cooling apparatus—for instance by passing current through resistive elements, where electron scattering dissipates energy as lattice vibrations, or by mechanically opening a gas valve through linkage motion.
A further rise in air temperature increases the coil’s angular displacement in the opposite direction, separating the contacts and interrupting the current. All subsequent stages of equipment operation likewise reduce to chains of mechanical contact forces, momentum exchange, and electromagnetic interactions among charged particles and fields.
The action of the thermostat is therefore explained by the local action of Newtonian mechanics, statistical mechanics of molecular assemblies, and classical electromagnetism operating at the scale of atoms and electrons.
No "information" required.
>> Then approach it this way: I claim the thermometer contains no information. Provide me with evidence that it does.
ReplyDelete>Again, it is hard for me to believe that you are really advancing this argument in good faith. Do you really deny that a thermometer contains information about (the temperature of) its environment? What do you think the word "thermometer" *means*???
Again, you seem to think it is trivial to know this, yet you refuse to explain it after repeated requests.
If it is so trivial, why is there no agreement on it? There is this PBS show, Closer to Truth, whose host went to the FQxi conference on the Physics of Information (2014) and asked all of these scientists "What is information?," and every one of them gave a different answer, if they answered it at all. At 9:35 in the video, the host asks, "Here is the cruxe of the issue: is information only an analytical tool and helpful metaphor, or does information lead to or become the ultimate source of everything"? Which is similar to the question I've been asking you. He has even more videos where he asks the same question (see the interview with Peter Tse for a particularly interesting take on it) -- but still everyone gives a different answer.
So it doesn't appear trivial to me. If conferences are being held among some of the top scientists in the world, and none of them agree with each other, it seems like it's an open question!
Scott Aaronson has this very long blog post on Is "information is physical" contentful?" about what information is; he makes an argument it is physical using quantum mechanics, general relativity, and black holes. This is ... difficult to follow. Although the first comment in the blog by Sean Carroll is more helpful, comparing information to energy (an extrinsic parameter) -- although that contradicts Aaronson, as under Carroll, it's just a useful model or metaphor.
Then there is the Thorne-Hawking-Preskill bet regarding the "black hole information paradox". Which appears to say that information can fall into black hole and the question is whether it comes out again. Which appears to say information has some sort of reality.
Then there's prior you, who has argued that the only stuff that exists is the standard model, quantum mechanics, electromagnetic fields, gravity, and I suppose the laws of nature themselves. Information is not in that set.
My current thinking is that information is just a human idea we use to help simplify the description of complicated physical systems. Which would mean information does not exist in the physical world, only in human brains as ideas. Your definition of information as "correlation among states of phyiscal systems" only reinforces this view, as "correlation" is another human idea which uses mathematics (another human idea). So "information" is just a convenient method to describe complicated physical systems whose description would be tediously long without it, and the model those physical systems so we can make predictions about them.
@Publius:
ReplyDelete>> You have been trolling my blog for years.
> Actually, I haven't.
Yes, you have. You're doing it right now:
> Try to wrap your head around that.
I really should call that your third strike, but you do raise a few valid points so I'm going to let it slide this time.
> "information" is just a human idea.
That depends on what you mean by "just". It is "just" a human idea to the exact same extent that the word "chair" is "just" a human idea. In order to decide what is and is not a chair you need humans because they are the ultimate arbiters. But that doesn't mean that chairs -- the referents of the word "chair" -- are not physically real. Chairs are physical objects, so if you accept the Objective Reality Hypothesis, then those objects exist independent of humans.
> You've changed from "thermometer" to "thermostat".
Yes, because in order to give you an example of a thermometer having a causal effect, I have to connect that thermometer to some other physical system somehow. A thermostat is a ready-made example of a thermometer connected in such a way. The word "thermostat" saves me a lot of typing.
But you have apparently missed that point:
> Here is a description of a mechanical thermostat
What you wrote after that, which I am eliding, is exactly the "lot of typing" that using the word "thermostat" was designed to avoid, and actually writing it out in all of its gory details is an example of you trolling. The mechanical details of the thermostat don't matter, and serve only to obscure the point: a thermostat is a mechanical device that answers your challenge of providing an example of how "the information contained within a thermometer can cause [something] to happen."
> No "information" required.
Yes, that's true. Information is not *required*. You didn't have to type out the gory details of how a thermostat works to make that point.
Yes, it is possible to provide a complete description of the behavior of the world without referring to information, just as it is possible to provide a complete description of the behavior of the world without referring to chairs -- with one important exception: people talk about chairs, and people talk about information, and when they do they seem to be able to have coherent conversations about both of those things. That is an observation that needs to be explained, and it is the *only* observation that *requires* mentioning either chairs or information. In all other cases, both of those concepts are optional. But choosing to use them is going to make things an awful lot easier to understand down the road.
@Publius (part 2 of 2):
ReplyDelete> If it is so trivial, why is there no agreement on it?
I never said it was trivial. It is far from trivial. But this series is not intended to advance the boundaries of human knowledge, it is intended to explain difficult concepts to a lay audience who has been bamboozled by the likes of you, people who intentionally obfuscate and confuse.
There is no agreement about "information" for the same reason that there is no agreement about "chairs": there is more than one possible definition of the word "information" that accounts for all observations. I have chosen one definition for the purpose of exposition, a definition that a layman can understand, and one that doesn't require me to start writing mathematical equations. (One of the constraints I've imposed on myself is to explain this stuff with as little math as possible.) The fact that other definitions are possible is irrelevant, and so pointing out that other definitions are possible is trolling.
> Scott Aaronson has this very long blog post on Is "information is physical" contentful?" about what information is; he makes an argument it is physical using quantum mechanics, general relativity, and black holes. This is ... difficult to follow.
Indeed, and bringing it up is trolling. I have not yet gotten to quantum mechanics, general relativity, and black holes. I've barely even scratched the surface of classical mechanics.
> Then there's prior you, who has argued that the only stuff that exists is the standard model, quantum mechanics, electromagnetic fields, gravity, and I suppose the laws of nature themselves. Information is not in that set.
No, I have never said that this is all that *exists*. What I have said is that the Standard Model is sufficient to account for all physical phenomena in our solar system. Note that this does not refer to "existence" at all.
You don't actually read what I write. You don't respond to what I write, you respond to imagined versions of what I write. That is known as the straw-man fallacy, and when you do it as often as you do it becomes trolling.
> My current thinking is that information is just a human idea we use to help simplify the description of complicated physical systems.
The *word* "information" is a human idea that we use to help simplify the description of complicated physical systems, just like the word "chair" is a human idea that we use to help simplify the description of complicated physical systems. But you do these ideas an injustice by dismissing them as trivial with the word "just". Inventing a word that helps simplify the description of complicated physical systems is an incredibly powerful act, one of the most impressive things that human brains do.
> Which would mean information does not exist in the physical world, only in human brains as ideas.
Information exists in the physical world to the same extent that heat exists. Or baseball games. Or birthdays. Or democracy. Or mornings. Or Mondays. Or any of the myriad other words I could list that refer to things that are in some sense real but are not made of atoms.
> Your definition of information as "correlation among states of phyiscal systems" only reinforces this view, as "correlation" is another human idea which uses mathematics (another human idea). So "information" is just a convenient method to describe complicated physical systems whose description would be tediously long without it, and the model those physical systems so we can make predictions about them.
Yes, this is mostly right. Your only mistake is trivializing the power of the concept of information as "just" another human idea. It's not "just" another human idea, it is one of the most powerful ideas humans have ever come up with. Information is indeed the stuff that ideas themselves are made of.
So then a complete physical description of systems such as the thermostat is possible without reference to ""information," and that the concept functions primarily as a tool to simplify descriptions of complex physical configurations, enabling human understanding, coherent conversation, and prediction.
ReplyDeleteIf that is accurate, then information operates as a human idea or modeling abstraction rather than an independent element within the physical ontology. As such, it would lack spatial extension, mass, or independent causal power -- in contrast to the entities and interactions (molecular collisions, lattice strains, electromagnetic forces, and currents) that fully account for the thermostat’s operation in the microphysical description provided earlier. Every step in that causal chain proceeds through local physical processes alone.
This characterization seems consistent with your account. If "information" possesses additional ontological or causal properties beyond serving as a descriptive convenience, could you specify what they are and how they enter the physical processes?
>Yes, this is mostly right.
You might even say "Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions. They compress complexity by modeling relevant degrees of freedom, correlations, or functional mappings. These idealized models enable prediction and control when full microscopic simulation is impossible.
I have never trolled you. Difficulty reconciling this straightforward factual statement with a preexisting interpretive model of my intentions and communicative goals may reflect cognitive dissonance -- the psychological discomfort that arises when new information conflicts with established assumptions or beliefs. In such cases, individuals sometimes employ defense mechanisms, such as motivated reasoning or attribution bias, particularly when repeatedly confronted with corrections that challenge prior positions. This can result in the dismissal of the opposing party as motivated by bad faith or as employing deceptive and unfair tactics (e.g., labeling substantive challenges as "trolling"), rather than engaging with the content of the arguments themselves.
> So then a complete physical description of systems such as the thermostat is possible without reference to ""information," and that the concept functions primarily as a tool to simplify descriptions of complex physical configurations, enabling human understanding, coherent conversation, and prediction.
DeleteNo, the idea of information doesn't *simplify* anything, it *explains observations*, specifically, it explains the observation that humans (profess to) have intuitions about something that they call "information", and that they think that brains and books and computers and DNA contain it, that it can be copied, that it can be transmitted from one place to another, and so on.
> If that is accurate
It isn't.
> This characterization seems consistent with your account.
No, it isn't. Not even close. Where have I ever said anything even remotely resembling "the concept [of information] functions primarily as a tool to simplify descriptions of complex physical configurations"? You made that up out of whole cloth.
I said it before, I'll say it again: you are not engaging with what I have written at all. You are just making shit up. For example:
> You might even say "Information" is a set of models that serve as course-grained, high-level abstractions.
No. "Information" is nothing of the sort. Information is, as I have said over and over, correlations between states of systems, nothing more, nothing less.
> I have never trolled you.
You are doing it right now. You are making up random shit that is a reflection of your own prejudices and bears not even a passing resemblance to anything that I have actually written. In fact, you show no indication that you have even read anything that I have written at all, or, if you have read it, you haven't understood it. AFAICT, you just see the word "information" and start regurgitating some random bullshit that you got off a Christian apologetics webs site.
Information is correlations between states of systems. If the state of a system A is correlated with a state of a system B, then A contains information about B, and B contains information about A. (And note that this relationship is always necessarily symmetric!)
So now I have a homework assignment for you: write out "Information is correlations between states of systems" by hand 100 times. After you have done that, see if you can come up with a counterexample, something that can reasonably be called "information" that does not conform to this definition. Then come back here and either give me your example, or admit that you can't come up with one.
If you comment with *anything* else, I will not publish it. I've had it with you.
Perry's messy shopper: A shopper (Perry himself) is pushing a grocery cart through a supermarket. He notices a trail of sugar on the floor, evidently leaking from a torn sack in someone's cart. He forms the belief: "The shopper with the torn sack is making a mess."
ReplyDeleteHe proceeds to follow the trail, looking for the careless shopper, intending to inform them. Eventually, he realizes that he is that shopper -- the leaking sack is in his own cart. At that moment, his belief shifts to: "I am making a mess."
This realization immediately changes his behavior: he stops, checks his cart, and fixes the problem.
Perry's messy shopper already knew every objective fact about the sugar trail and the leaking bag. What he lacked was the indexical information "I am the messy shopper." If information is only correlations between physical states, what new correlation appeared when he reached that realization? The external correlations were unchanged. The only thing that changed was the subject's self-location within those facts. Your definition seems unable to distinguish objective information from indexical information.
Delete> What he lacked was the indexical information
There is no such thing as "indexical information." An indexical is a word of phrase whose meaning changes depending on the context in which they are spoken, words like "I" and "you" and "here" and "now" and "yesterday" and "tomorrow". It is a concept that has absolutely nothing to do with information.
The word "information" does not appear in the main body of the paper you cited, nor in the SEP article on indexicals. Your whole comment is an absurd non-sequitur, and makes it very clear that you have made zero effort to actually understand any of this stuff. In other words, you are once again trolling. That is your third strike. I will no longer publish any comments from you, at least not on this topic.
P.S. It is also clear that you did not read part 7 of this series.
DeleteI'm not sure what theory of information you are using. In Shannon's theory of information, information is related to the degree to which the next symbol is unpredictable. Correlations make the next symbol more predictable, and therefore they decrease information.
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory#Entropy_of_an_information_source
I'm using mutual entropy. It's a little unorthodox, but I think it's easier for non-technical people to understand than regular information entropy. It also leads more naturally into quantum mechanics when we eventually get to that.
DeleteBTW, all of these different definitions of information (or entropy) are all just different ways of looking at the same underlying concept. Fundamentally information is all about the correlations of random variables. The standard definition of information is about correlations of random variables across time (i.e. the "next token") whereas mutual entropy is about correlations of random variables across space. But even time and space are really the same thing because relativity.
DeleteWhy not apply a Bayesian argument to creationism? Like, what is the probability of this story having a true supernatural origin, versus having a natural origin, taking into account the propensity for such stories to be propagated despite being human inventions?
ReplyDeleteBayes's theorem only applies in situations where there is an actual sample space, but in God's case we only have one data point -- our universe -- so you can't apply Bayes's theorem.
DeleteMaybe I don't know how to make it rigorous. But to me it comes down to, is this story that I'm being told credible? Is it more likely to be accurate information faithfully passed down to me, or is it more likely to have natural origins? The problems with it being accurate are that there are many versions of it, about as many versions as people telling it (and they're not all compatible, despite what some people say); the fact that it sounds made up for the benefit of humans (humans are at the center of the story, despite the vastness of the universe); and there are many smart people that don't believe it. I can't find a flaw in that line of reasoning.
DeleteBelieve me, I sympathize. The problem is that you are looking at it through the lens of your life experience. If you had grown up surrounded by people who believed in God you would (or at least could) be making the exact same argument in support of God: the stories seem credible because they are being told to you by people that you consider trustworthy, and there are many smart people (or at least people who appear to be smart) who believe those stories. Go back and re-read Part 5.
Delete"The $64,000 question is now: can these "scientific facts" account for all of our observations? Can they answer all of our questions? In particular, can they answer the Big Questions: What is consciousness? What is love? Do we have free will? What is the standard for moral behavior? What happens after we die? And perhaps most importantly, why are we here? What is the point? Humans are just so damned complicated that it seems a priori impossible that all of our subjective experience could be accounted for in this way, that our entire existence can be reduced merely to "atoms doing their thing."
DeleteIn the rest of this series I am going to argue that yes, it can".
I strongly disagree. There are questions that we'd like to know the answer to, but, I argue, can't be answered by science. Which is not to say they can be answered by non-science. They just can't be answered. Consciousness can't be explained, because it can't even be defined [1] (I admit I haven't read that whole article, but I think that it gets to the bottom of it.) Free will, if you define it as human behavior having a cause that is outside of nature, is untestable. Science can only uncover natural causes. "What is love?" You could break this question down into two parts: the biological mechanism, which is the domain of science; and the subjective experience, which is tied up with the problem of consciousness. "Why are we here? What is the point?" These questions can't be posed scientifically.
I think there's a clear distinction to be made between questions that can be answered through rigorous empirical means and ones that can't. Ones that can't tend to deal with the "extra-natural" (and to say "because god" doesn't actually explain anything).
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
> Consciousness can't be explained, because it can't even be defined
DeleteThat's not necessarily a show-stopper. We can't define "chair" either but that doesn't mean that chairs can't be explained scientifically.
There's no science experiment that you can do to prove that something is a chair. People might call something a chair, or people might be observed sitting on it, but is it a real chair, or are those people mixing up a sittable nonchair with a chair? That can't be resolved scientifically. If you were going to study chairs scientifically, you would have to assume the definition of chair, and accept axiomatically the opinion of the experimenters that what they're studying are actual chairs.
DeleteIf you were going to study consciousness scientifically, first you would have to say what you mean by consciousness, and it would have to be defined in terms that you could study. All science can do is find relationships between naturalistic objects or concepts. In philosophy apparently they have come up with the concept of zombies, which would be indistinguishable from people but not actually feel pain. This article is short: [1]. Alan Turing made his test for determining if a machine can think about convincing a person. An LLM could convince a person, but does it really think? I think Turing designed his test this way because "real thinking" is undefinable and can't determined scientifically.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_character_of_experience
> There's no science experiment that you can do to prove that something is a chair
DeleteThat's true. Nonetheless, I can predict with odds much better than chance whether someone will answer yes or no to the question, "Is this a chair?" and I can absolutely demonstrate that with an experiment.
> If you were going to study consciousness scientifically, first you would have to say what you mean by consciousness
No, that's not true. Again, I can simply observe people's I/O behavior and the fact that (for example) they sleep, that general anesthesia is a thing, etc. and produce a model that explains those observations.
Another refutation is to point to quantum mechanics where there is this thing called "the wave function" that no one can say what it actually is. "Measurement" is also a word that stubbornly resists a crisp definition. But that doesn't make QM unscientific.
I'm not a physicist, but what I gather is that the measurement problem in QM is something nobody is particularly comfortable with; kind of like singularities, except probably weirder. What QM has going for it is being able to predict the outcomes of experiments. If somebody found a formula that somehow predicted some measurable aspect of consciousness, that still wouldn't fully explain consciousness. Suppose you found a computer chip inside people's brains with the source code to consciousness. If you copied the code onto your computer and ran it, would the copy be conscious? I would argue that you can't know.
Delete> If somebody found a formula that somehow predicted some measurable aspect of consciousness
DeleteThat's not even hard: I predict that, if asked, you would profess to be experience a subjective sensation that you call "consciousness". Furthermore, I predict that you will report losing that experience (or at least having it significantly altered) on a regular basis when you do something called "sleeping". It is no different than predicting that, if I asked "do you see that chair over there?" you would say "yes" if there actually was a chair over there, and "no" if there wasn't.
I'm not sure what you are arguing here. That it's possible to know everything we need to know about consciousness without being able to define it?
DeleteYour overall worldview seems to be in agreement with "New Atheism," which is associated with Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, among others. I would be interested to know what you think of their positions and where you may diverge. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Atheism
Another minor point I wanted to make. You say that people believe in atoms. I think that for a lot of people, they know very little about atoms. If you told them that a scientist had proved that matter isn't made of atoms after all, they would go along with it. Their belief about atoms is more like a quantum superposition of many possible ideas than a single defined thing.
Delete> it's possible to know everything we need to know about consciousness without being able to define it?
DeleteUm, no? How would you get that idea? My argument is that it's possible to have a coherent discussion of consciousness without formally defining it just as it's possible to have a coherent conversation about chairs without formally defining "chair".
> I would be interested to know what you think of [new atheism]
I agree with most of their intellectual arguments, but I am vehemently opposed to the misogyny, transphobia and islamophobia that have become part and parcel of the new atheist movement. IMO the New Atheists made three fundamental mistakes. First, they severely underestimated the psychological value of faith. One of the reasons they failed is that they tried to undermine faith without offering anything comparable to replace it. Second, they ascribe the most extreme religious views to everyone who self-identifies in a particular way. In their view, everyone who self-identifies as Muslim is a member of a world-wide conspiracy to impose sharia law. Everyone who self-identifies as Christian is a zombie-worshipping moron. And third, they use their fame and notoriety as licenses to behave like assholes even towards people who ostensibly agree with them, especially women. New atheism is indistinguishable to me from any other cult. And I will say that same about the Rationalist movement spearheaded by Eliezer Yudkowski. It is not a coincidence that there is not a single leader of either of these movements who is not a white male. I agree with their premises, but by the time they reach their conclusions they have run way off the rails.
> If you told them that a scientist had proved that matter isn't made of atoms after all, they would go along with it.
That is not a hypothetical. And I'm going to eventually get to that in this series.
> Their belief about atoms is more like a quantum superposition of many possible ideas than a single defined thing.
Yeah, that's fine. The reason for starting with atoms is not that atoms are the last word, it's just something that is relatively uncontroversial among laymen at this point in time. It lets me skip over about 100 years of scientific controversy in a series that I am already struggling to keep from getting too long for modern attention spans.
> It lets me skip over about 100 years of scientific controversy in a series that I am already struggling to keep from getting too long for modern attention spans.
DeleteHa! It's already there.
What about Richard Dawkins? Has he advanced bigoted views? I thought he was a respected science guy.
> Ha! It's already there.
DeleteWell, that's discouraging. :-(
> What about Richard Dawkins? Has he advanced bigoted views?
Sadly, yes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n09JGRMfMds
"Consciousness can't be explained, because it can't even be defined" - NB
DeleteAs far as origins are concerned, perhaps one way to solve this problem would be to for people to come to an agreement on, perhaps 1 or 2 things that consciousness DOES. Does it create a model of the outside world? Does it make decisions? Things like that. And then try to figure out if such a feature could have arose naturally.
I would feel a bit intellectually dishonest if I said to Ron something like "Well, you didn't exhaustively define what consciousness is. So, I win the debate!" :D
It's hard to even put words to what it is about consciousness that I feel is impossible. And that is exactly the problem. I guess it's part of the same question as "why are we here?" Consciousness is the "we". Everything we know about in nature is inanimate. We can see how rocks are formed out of atoms. We really have no idea how you get from inanimate starting material to a thing with a "we". We would have no reason to predict that such a thing could exist, by looking at atoms and quantum fields and things. Except that it does.
DeleteI don't know that much philosophy, but I'm pretty sure that it's a very old problem to them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind
> We really have no idea how you get from inanimate starting material to a thing with a "we".
DeleteThat's not true. We have a *very* good idea of how you get from inanimate material to "we", it's just a long story, and modern folk have short attention spans. Also, people are very resistant to facing the possibility that they were not created by God because they think it's going to lead to existential despair, which is not an entirely unfounded concern.
@Ron:
ReplyDelete>There is no such thing as "indexical information."
While John Perry's original paper was about essential indexicals, philosophers routinely speak of:
indexical information
self-locating information
de se information
de se belief
These are closely related terms describing the same phenomenon. For example, David Lewis explicitly discusses self-locating information and argues that some information cannot be captured by purely objective propositions. Likewise, later work by philosophers such as Robert Stalnaker, David Chalmers, and others routinely uses the language of self-locating or indexical information.
Saying "the phrase doesn't appear in Perry's paper" is like saying Newton never used the phrase "classical mechanics." True, but irrelevant.
Perry's argument does not depend on the phrase "indexical information." Call it self-locating knowledge or de se belief if you prefer. The philosophical question remains the same. Before Perry's realization, every objective fact about the supermarket was already known to him: someone was leaking sugar, the trail originated from that person, etc. After the realization, no external physical correlation had changed, yet Perry acquired a new belief -- "I am the shopper leaking sugar" -- which immediately altered his behavior. My question is unchanged: under your definition of information as "correlations between states of systems," what new correlation came into existence at that moment? If none did, then your definition appears unable to explain the cognitive difference Perry's example was designed to illustrate.
It's puzzling you're so dogmatic about your definition of information. Surely you know there are about 30 other definitions, notable ones being Fisher Information and Kolmogorov Complexity. Shannon mutual information is not even the most general of mutual information, as that would perhaps be the Tsallis information measure. I've avoided bringing these up as I didn't want to derail your science discussion.
I just wanted to clarify the physical ontology of "information". I think I finally got an answer from you that it's ideas in human brains. It took a lot of effort to get that. I've had an interest in ontology in the past year and wanted to know if you had an interesting take on it.
Defining "information" dogmatically as Shannon mutual information leaves a lot of open questions:
1. What about spurious correlations? A famous one is the Hemline Index, which correlates length of women's hemlines correlates to economic health. Is that "information"?
2. One can transform correlated random variables using several methods (Gram-Schmidt, Independent Component Analysis, probability integral transformation, nonlinear transformation) to make the two variables orthogonal to each other. That will eliminate (or at least reduce) all Shannon mutual information by inducing statistical independence. This illustrates the limitation of reducing "information" to solely mutual information between states, as the quantity can be created, destroyed, or nullified by reparameterization without altering the underlying physical reality.
3. Say I monitor a radioactive sample over successive short time intervals, recording a binary outcome: 1 if a decay event occurs in the interval, 0 otherwise. The result is a random binary string. It has no correlation with any external reference. Yet surely that sequence is informing me something about that sample. Equating information with mutual information fails to account for intrinsic, self-referential, or source-generated information arising from stochastic physical processes.
Shannon mutual information is a valuable tool for certain dependencies but insufficient as a complete ontology or definition of information.
I decided to publish your comment against my better judgement despite the fact that you clearly have still not done your homework.
Delete> philosophers routinely speak of...
Philosophers routinely speak of all manner of bullshit.
> Call it self-locating knowledge or de se belief if you prefer
And this is the perfect example. You are conflating information, knowledge, and belief, but these are three different things. It's like trying to argue that chairs are a mode of transportation by saying that a car is a mobile chair because it has seats. It's not wrong per se, but it is a stupid argument because it undermines the utility of the words "chair" and "car".
> Saying "the phrase doesn't appear in Perry's paper" is like saying Newton never used the phrase "classical mechanics." True, but irrelevant.
That is a completely false analogy. The phrase "classical mechanics" did not exist while Newton was alive. But information theory was invented long before the works you cite.
Also, I'm pretty sure that John Perry actually understands the difference between information, knowledge, and belief, and that his use failure to use the word "information" is not incidental.
> Call it self-locating knowledge or de se belief if you prefer. The philosophical question remains the same.
That may be, though I'm pretty sure you don't actually understand the philosophical question that Perry is raising. Perry is talking about indexicals, but you are talking about coming to realizations, of the subjective sensation of suddenly becoming aware of something you didn't know before despite (apparently) not having any new information. You don't have to resort to anywhere near as obscure and unlikely a scenario as Perry's sugar-leaker to make this point. Anyone who looks at a Sudoku puzzle has immediate access to every objective fact about that puzzle, and yet it may take quite a bit of time to figure out what number belongs in every square. That is, after all, the *whole point* of a Sudoku puzzle. People do not have immediate access to the transitive closure of the logical implications of all the information they have immediate access to. This is one of the distinctions between information and knowledge. This is not a particularly deep insight. It's immediately obvious to anyone who thinks about it for more than two minutes. Which is a pretty good clue that this is not what Perry is talking about.
But either way, it's a non-sequitur.
> I just wanted to clarify the physical ontology of "information".
No, you just wanted to obscure and obfuscate by conflating information, knowledge, and belief.
> I think I finally got an answer from you that it's ideas in human brains.
No!!! Ideas in human brains are one example of information, but they are *also* examples of knowledge and belief, which is why citing the as examples of information obfuscates more than it clarifies. But the ontological status of information is nothing more and nothing less than what I have been saying over and over again: information is correlations between states of systems. Those systems can be brains, but they don't have to be.
> Defining "information" dogmatically as Shannon mutual information
DeleteI'm doing that for three reasons. First, mutual information is easier for a layman to understand. It doesn't require a deep dive into probability theory. Second, all other kinds of information can be straightforwardly defined in terms of mutual information. And third, I am engaged in a particular kind of pedagogy here, trying to communicate difficult topics to a non-technical audience. Some simplifications are necessary.
> 1. What about spurious correlations? A famous one is the Hemline Index, which correlates length of women's hemlines correlates to economic health. Is that "information"?
This is the perfect illustration of why it is important to be precise with the definitions of words. "Spurious" means "Lacking authenticity or validity in essence or origin; not genuine." It is far from clear whether the hemline index is spurious under this definition. Another example is the Pentagon Pizza Index.
There are spurious correlations, but they are rare, and we can say with precision just how rare they are. For example, it is possible to flip a fair coin 100 times and get 100 heads. The odds of this happening are exactly 1 in 2^100, so if this ever happens it is vastly more likely that you are dealing with a two-headed coin than a spurious correlation.
> 2. One can transform correlated random variables using several methods (Gram-Schmidt, Independent Component Analysis, probability integral transformation, nonlinear transformation)
Again, you don't have to get so pedantic. You can get rid of all of the apparent correlations by encryption. (That's the *whole point* of encryption!) But encryption is a distraction.
> 3. Say I monitor a radioactive sample over successive short time intervals, recording a binary outcome: 1 if a decay event occurs in the interval, 0 otherwise. The result is a random binary string. It has no correlation with any external reference.
That's right.
> Yet surely that sequence is informing me something about that sample.
Like what?
You say "surely" as if it is just immediately obvious, but not only is it not obvious, it is *wrong*. That *sequence* is not informing you about *anything*. Whatever information is contained in that sequence, the fact that it's a sequence is irrelevant. You could rearrange all of the entries in that sequence without losing any of the information it contains. The *set* of numbers contains information but the *sequence* does not.
>I'm pretty sure you don't actually understand the philosophical question that Perry is raising.
Delete:D
>> I think I finally got an answer from you that it's ideas in human brains.
ReplyDelete>No!!! Ideas in human brains are one example of information, but they are *also* examples of knowledge and belief, which is why citing the as examples of information obfuscates more than it clarifies. But the ontological status of information is nothing more and nothing less than what I have been saying over and over again: information is correlations between states of systems. Those systems can be brains, but they don't have to be.
So I just want to know if information has a physical ontology.
What is "information"? You'll say, "it is correlations among states of systems."
Fine. But what is that? Can you define in in term of anything more fundamental?
As it is, you have several human ideas in the definition:
* Correlation
* Mathematics (including logarithms!)
* Probability
* statistics
Which would lead me to conclude that "information" is a just a human idea -- a description we create to more easily understand the physical world.
But the true underlying physical ontology is just atoms interacting with each other, along with electromagnetism and gravity, according to the laws of physics.
Information is surely a very powerful and helpful description, but is has no physical being.
Does "wind" have a physical ontology? After all, wind is nothing more than air molecules moving in a particular way, and part of that "particular way" of moving involves correlations, i.e. in order to be considred "wind" rather than "heat" the molecules all have to be moving in the same direction. Does wind have a "true underlying physical ontology" or is it "just a human idea"?
Delete>There are spurious correlations, but they are rare, and we can say with precision just how rare they are.
ReplyDelete"Spurious correlation" means a correlation that appears statistically significant (or strong) by chance when there is no real underlying association, or when the association is unstable/non-generalizable.
You are badly wrong about how rare they are. They are incredibly common, as if you have n variables, then there are n(n-1)/2 pairwise correlations of them. The number of true, meaningful correlations, will be a tiny fraction of all possible pairs. One reason I was compensated so highly in my engineering career was my ability to distinguish spurious correlation from real correlation.
Tyler Vigen has a humorous website of spurious correlations he has found.
It is far from clear that all of these are spurious correlations. I can think of plausible explanations for many of them, and for the rest, even if a plausible explanation is not apparent doesn't mean one doesn't exist.
DeleteSpurious correlations are "common" only in the sense that it's pretty easy to find things that intuitively look like correlations but aren't. This is the reason that statics is a thing. But *true* spurious correlations, i.e. things that reliably pass statistical tests but don't have causal mechanisms behind them are *extremely* rare, and we can precisely quantify exactly how rare they are.
>You can get rid of all of the apparent correlations by encryption. (That's the *whole point* of encryption!)
ReplyDeleteSo does that reduce or eliminate the Shannon mutual information?
>You say "surely" as if it is just immediately obvious, but not only is it not obvious, it is *wrong*. That *sequence* is not informing you about *anything*. Whatever information is contained in that sequence, the fact that it's a sequence is irrelevant.
1. The average rate of 1s directly tells you the activity of the source (decays per unit time). From that you extract the number of radioactive atoms present and the decay constant λ. That is quantitative information about that specific sample.
2. The statistical structure (approximately Poisson counts in successive intervals, memoryless inter-arrival times) confirms that the underlying process is quantum tunneling with constant probability per unit time, independent of external conditions. If the sequence deviated significantly from those statistics, you would correctly conclude something was wrong with your assumptions about the sample or the detector. That is informative.
3. The very fact that the sequence shows no correlation with external references (temperature, electromagnetic fields, etc.) is itself information: it tells you the decay is spontaneous and internal rather than triggered by outside influences. That rules out whole classes of alternative mechanisms.
>You could rearrange all of the entries in that sequence without losing any of the information it contains. The *set* of numbers contains information but the *sequence* does not.
This is incorrect for a point process like radioactive decay. Shuffling destroys the temporal structure that actually carries physical information:
1. The distribution of waiting times between events, the absence of clustering or memory effects, and the specific run-length statistics are all properties of the ordered sequence. These are not preserved under arbitrary rearrangement.
2. For a Poisson process, the sequence encodes the memoryless property and the constant hazard rate. A shuffled version of the same marginal counts does not necessarily preserve the same higher-order temporal statistics that let you test whether the process really is memoryless.
3. If you are extracting entropy from the decay events (as is done in quantum random number generators), it is the sequence — the unpredictable succession of bits — that constitutes the usable randomness.
Shuffling it after the fact does not change the marginal entropy, but that is irrelevant; the information is generated by the ordered stochastic process in real time.
The deeper problem is that your definition keeps forcing information to be a correlation between two distinct systems. Radioactive decay is a canonical example of intrinsic stochastic process in physics. The information (in the sense of unpredictability, entropy production, and what the observations tell us about the microphysical process) does not require an external "reference system" to exist. The sequence is informative precisely because it is the output of that specific physical source with its particular statistics.
Now, I understand if you don't want to deal with this complication of "information" at this point in your writing series.
Again, my interest is simply on your thoughts on the physical ontology of information. I'm not convinced it has any physical ontology (it is just a human ideas -- a description we create), but I'd love to be proven wrong.
> does [encryption] reduce or eliminate the Shannon mutual information?
DeleteNo. The operative word in "You can get rid of all of the apparent correlations by encryption" is "apparent". The correlations in encrypted text are still there, but they are obscured. I can't go into much more detail than that without giving you a full primer on cryptography, which I am not going to do.
> Again, my interest is simply on your thoughts on the physical ontology of information. I'm not convinced it has any physical ontology (it is just a human ideas -- a description we create), but I'd love to be proven wrong.
I have no idea what you mean by "physical ontology." Does software have a "physical ontology"? Does wind have a "physical ontology"? Sunrise? Sporting events? Anniversaries? Chairs? All of these are nothing more and nothing less than atoms arranged and/or moving in certain ways. Call that a "physical ontology" or not, as you wish. I really don't care.
>The deeper problem is that your definition keeps forcing information to be a correlation between two distinct systems. Radioactive decay is a canonical example of intrinsic stochastic process in physics. The information (in the sense of unpredictability, entropy production, and what the observations tell us about the microphysical process) does not require an external "reference system" to exist. The sequence is informative precisely because it is the output of that specific physical source with its particular statistics.
DeleteWell, couldn't we say the rate of decay correlates with the energy state of the isotope? The more unstable the energy state is, the faster it will decay, no? I realize we can't know exactly WHEN a specific nucleus from a sample will decay, but we also cannot know exactly which leaf will fall from a tree tomorrow.
Since Samuel brought this up:
Delete> The deeper problem is that your definition keeps forcing information to be a correlation between two distinct systems.
Actually, the systems are not required to be distinct. A system can be considered to be correlated with itself and therefore contains information about itself. It just turns out that this is not very interesting, at least not from the perspective of figuring out how DNA and human brains do their thing. (It is interesting when you start pondering https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole_information_paradox but we already have enough to worry about without getting into *those* weeds.)
Ah, I see!
Delete