Sunday, May 17, 2026

Seeking God in Science part 8: Caring

In the previous installment in this series I introduced the concept of information, which I defined as correlations between states.  Commenter Samuel (whose profile says he is a Young Earth Creationist) pointed out that:

Shannon entropy implicitly requires a mind to decide which distinct states will be recognized in order to assign a value to "n" (where n is the number of possible states.) [Emphasis added]

This is a fair criticism based on what I wrote:

Notice that when we say that a switch or a light has two states we have ignored a lot of details.  The actual physical state of a switch or a light includes a lot more than just whether it is on or off.  For starters, there is the actual physical location of the light or the switch.  A switch can be mounted on a wall, or it can be part of a lamp, or connected directly to some wires and not be mounted on anything at all.  But these kinds of details don't matter for the aspect of a light switch's behavior that we actually care about.  [Emphasis added.]

This implicitly tied my definition of information to the concept of caring about things.  What if there are correlations that we don't care about?  Do those correlations also contain information?

The answer is yes!  The reason I introduced things "that we actually care about" is not because this is essential to the concept of information, but just to make the concept easier to understand.   Information is not limited to things we care about, it's just easier to think about if we focus our attention on familiar examples like lights and switches and coins.  More specifically, it's easier to talk about if we limit our attention to things we have words for, and even more specifically, to words whose meanings are unambiguous.  Given that even prosaic words like "chair" have fuzzy boundaries, this is a tall order.

The reason for using a coin flip as an example is not because there is anything particularly special about coins per se, but that the procedure for flipping a coin is specifically designed to separate the possible states of the coin into two groups of states that can be easily and unambiguously distinguished from each other.  We call those groups of states "heads up" and "tails up", but those are not the only possible states the coin can be in.  A coin can be standing on edge, or spinning in the air, or bouncing on a hard surface.  And each of those descriptions actually encompasses a vast number of possible distinct physical states.  In fact, because the actual physical state of a coin (or anything else) involves the positions of atoms, the number of potential states might even be infinite.  We don't actually know if space and time are continuous or discrete.  If they are continuous, and if a physical process can cause two atoms to have positions that are perfectly correlated with each other, then the amount of information contained in that correlation would be infinite.

But here's the thing: even if this were possible, there is no way we could ever know.  The reasons are complicated and have to do with quantum mechanics which we haven't gotten to yet, so for now you will just have to trust me when I tell you that it is a fundamental fact of physics that any time you make a measurement the result must be discrete, and so can contain only a finite amount of information.

But all this is beside the point.  What actually matters is the claim often made by creationists that information cannot spontaneously emerge in nature.  This is absolute rubbish.  Information spontaneously emerges in nature all the time.  Any time the states of two systems become causally correlated, information is created.

However, there is still a potential valid criticism here.  It is possible that my definition of information as causal correlations between states is wrong, that it fails to adequately explain some observations.  Specifically, it fails to explain caring, i.e. the fact that we humans seem to be able to distinguish between information that we care about from information that we don't care about in the same way that we can distinguish chairs from non-chairs.  The information contained in books and newspapers and computers and DNA seems qualitatively different from the information contained in, say, a rock exposed to the elements.

There is no technical term to distinguish information in these two categories, and there is a reason for this: it turns out that there is no distinction.  But in order to explain why, I first have to lay out the argument for why there might be a distinction, and to do that I need words that distinguish between them.  In order not to prejudice the discussion, I'm simply going to call them type 1 and type 2.  Type 1 information comprises the correlations that arise from straightforward physical processes like rain falling on a rock.  Type 2 information is the kind that lives in human brains and DNA.

There are two main features that distinguish type 1 information from type 2.  First, type 2 information has a lot more complexity and structure than type 1, and second, type 2 information seems to be intimately related to intentionality, i.e. to caring about things.  (Note that here I am using the common definition of "intentionality", not the philosophical one.)  When we humans write books or blog posts or invent printing presses and computers, we do it in service of some kind of goal or purpose.  Likewise, the information in DNA seems to exist in service of the goal of producing life, without which the goals and purposes of human activities would obviously be moot.  In other words, type 2 information seems to have something to do not just with being correlated with something, but with caring about something.  And that distinction is ultimately rooted in our subjective experience of caring about things.  That subjective experience requires explanation.  One possible explanation is that caring is a fundamental component of objective reality, one that cannot be explained in terms of the mere movements of atoms.  It's kind of like "chairness" except that we ultimately were able to explain chairs in terms of the movements of atoms. But explaining caring is going to be a much tougher nut to crack.  We can see and touch chairs.  We can't see and touch caring.  We can't measure it.  Caring is a purely subjective experience (much like "believing").

Now, I am going to advance a hypothesis which I believe to be false, but which is designed to be a steel-manning of what some religious people believe.  I'm telegraphing this for two reasons.  If you are not religious, this is probably going to sound crazy, and I agree with you, it is.  But showing that it is crazy is actually not as easy as you might think.  And if you are religious, I'd be interested to know if you think I've gotten this right, if this is a fair representation of (part of) what you believe.  This hypothesis is intended to be a peer to the objective reality hypothesis.   I'm going to call it the transcendent mind hypothesis, but I could as well have called it the God-is-love hypothesis:

Our subjective sensation of caring is a sensory subjective experience that reflects a part of objective reality that lies beyond atoms, and therefore beyond what can be objectively measured, but which is nonetheless real.

In other words, our subjective experience of caring about things is every bit as much a reflection of reality as our subjective experience of seeing chairs.  In both cases we are experiencing something real, something outside of ourselves.  But in the case of chairs that something is made of atoms, and in the case of caring it is made of something else, something transcendent, and, most importantly, something that cares.  Specifically, something that cares about us, something that cares about our caring.  Something that could fairly be called God, even if it might diverge from standard theology in some details.

It is possible to show that this hypothesis is false, that it actually fails to account for all of our observations.  But doing that is much, much harder than I think most of my fellow atheists appreciate.  I think most atheists look at specific theologies, reject those (for very good reasons), but then end up throwing out the intentional baby with the theological bathwater.  In order to really explain caring you have to explain consciousness itself, and that is not easy.

I'm going to fast-forward through at least a dozen chapters and tell you what the answer is going to turn out to be: it is not necessary to posit a transcendent mind to explain our subjective experience of caring about things.  Caring can be explained in a purely materialistic way, purely as Atoms Doing Their Thing.  The TL;DR is that we were created by Darwinian evolution, a process which "cares" about reproductive fitness in the same way that water "cares" about flowing downhill to reach the ocean.  That process was physically reified here on earth as biological systems, and more specifically as a division of labor between genes encoded in DNA, and a phenotype that those genes produce.  One of the things that genes "figured out" out how to do is to build brains, because it turns out that genes that build brains have a reproductive advantage (in certain environments) over genes that don't.  And genes that build brains that care about things (like staying alive) have a reproductive advantage over genes that don't.

Like I said, that is vastly oversimplified.  It sweeps huge swathes of complexity and nuance under the rug.  But I didn't want to make you wait months before the Big Reveal.  In the chapters that follow I promise I will lift up the rug and tidy up properly.  But it's a big job.  The path to enlightenment is not an easy one.

Monday, May 11, 2026

Seeking God in Science part 7: Information, Knowledge and Belief

We are now finally ready to tackle three of the thorniest topics the human intellect has ever grappled with, the concepts of information, knowledge, and belief.  The relevance of these concepts to the scientific search for God should be obvious, but I want to be explicit about it because, as ever in this series, we're going to apply the scientific method.  That always begins with the identification of a Problem.  The Problem that is going to motivate our inquiry into information is the observation that our DNA appears to contain information, so we have to explain where that information came from.  Information generally seems to have its origins in some kind of intelligent agent, and so perhaps an intelligent agent is necessary to produce information.  If so there must be some kind of intelligent agent behind our DNA, and that agent might be God.

Likewise knowledge and belief also seem to have something to do with God.  You will often hear people say, "I believe in God", or "I believe in science", or "I know mommy is in heaven" or "I know there is a chair in the storage room."  We are going to try to construct a theory that explains these and many more observations about how people use the words "knowledge", "belief", and "information" in much the same way that we constructed a theory to explain our observations about how people use the word "chair."

Let's start with information because that is the least controversial, and there is actually an established scientific theory that explains it.  There can be little doubt that the word "information" refers to something real.  We live in the information age.  Books and computers store information.  Human activities create new information in the form of books and tweets and blog posts and research papers.  Information can be destroyed if your hard drive breaks and you don't have a backup.  Information can be copied and transmitted from place to place.  But what exactly is this stuff that is being created and destroyed and moved around?  What is it made of?  Is human intelligence required in order to produce it, or can it be created by some purely mechanistic process?

As a first cut we might guess that information is made of atoms, because everything is mode of atoms.  But this fails to explain some of our observations.  In particular, it fails to explain how information moves from one place to another.  To move a material object from one place to another you have to move the atoms that comprise that object.  And of course it is possible to move information this way too.  When a material object containing information (like a book or a thumb drive) moves from one place to another, the information it contains moves with it.  But it is possible to move the information contained in a material object without moving the object that contains it.  This is happening right now as you read this article.  Information is moving from a web server into your browser, and onto your computer screen, and into your eyes, and into your brain.  Before that, the information moved out of my brain and into my laptop, and from there (eventually) to the server.  But there are no atoms moving between these various locations, only light and electrical signals.

There is another important difference between how information can move from place to place and how material objects move.  A given material object can only be in one location at a time.  If you move a chair from A to B then at the end of that process the chair is no longer at A.  But you can move information from A to B and at the end of that process the information can be in both locations at the same time.  Not only that, but in some situations it is possible to make copies that are so good that you can't tell which one is the copy and which is the original.  (This is actually possible with material objects too.  Modern manufacturing processes can produce material objects that are for all practical purposes indistinguishable from one another.  When we get to quantum mechanics we will encounter objects that are indistinguishable not just for practical purposes but totally indistinguishable by any possible experiment.  Atoms are actually examples of such objects.  This will turn out to have truly profound implications.)

There is a final observation we can make that provides the vital clue about what information actually is: the same material object can contain different information at different times.  Again, your computer screen is the perfect example of this.  Right now, the screen contains some information.  Scroll, or go to a different web site or application, and your screen will contain different information even though it still contains all the same atoms as before.

You might want to pause and ponder before you go on to the next paragraph.  See if you can come up with a theory of information that explains all of these observations.  Here's a hint (massive spoiler alert): there is a reason that I'm talking about information immediately after introducing the concepts of systems and states.

The answer is that information is not a system, not a Thing.  Information is a state.  But it is a very special kind of state.  Not all states contain information.  If you turn your computer monitor off, then it will no longer contain any information (or at least a lot less that it does right now).  But how can we quantify this?  How do we distinguish information-containing states from states that don't contain information, or states that contain more information from states that contain less?

These questions were answered in the 1940s by Claude Shannon, who is one of the more famous scientists in history (so if you didn't figure out the answer to what information is, don't feel too bad, it really is a hard problem).  To help you better understand the answer I want to start by pointing out another feature that distinguishes information from other kinds of states: information is invariably about something.  The news is information about current events.  History is information about the past.  Your eyes give you information about your surroundings.  And so on and so on.  Information is always a relation between a thing that contains information and another thing that is the object of that information.

In fact, this turns out to be the distinguishing feature of information, and it is what allows us to formally quantify the amount of information contained in a state.  The more that the state of one system constrains the state of another, the more information is contained there.

This is all best illustrated with a simple example: consider a light switch.  It can be in one of two positions, on or off.  In the case of an old-school mechanical switch, these states are distinguished by the actual physical location of atoms.  A mechanical switch has two pieces of metal inside called contacts.  If there is space between the contacts, the switch is off.  If not, if the contacts are touching each other, the switch is on.  The light that the switch controls can likewise be in one of two states, which we also call on and off, even though these are radically different in character fro the state of the switch.  "On" means there is light being emitted, and "off" means there isn't.  The light contains information about the state of the switch.  If the light is in the on state, then so is the switch.  If the light is off, then so is the switch.

The quantity of information is the extent to which knowing the state of one system allows you to narrow down the possible states of another.  In the case of our light switch, both the switch and the light can be in one of two possible states.  If we know the state of either the switch or the light then we can narrow down the state of the other from 2 possibilities down to 1.  We typically express this quantity as a logarithm, specifically the base-2 logarithm, and the result is the familiar unit called a bit.  The base-2 logarithm of 2 is 1, so the switch and the light each contain 1 bit of information.  A base pair in a DNA molecule can be one of four possible bases, so every base pair contains 2 bits of information.

Notice that when we say that a switch or a light has two states we have ignored a lot of details.  The actual physical state of a switch or a light includes a lot more than just whether it is on or off.  For starters, there is the actual physical location of the light or the switch.  A switch can be mounted on a wall, or it can be part of a lamp, or connected directly to some wires and not be mounted on anything at all.  But these kinds of details don't matter for the aspect of a light switch's behavior that we actually care about.  Sometimes the actual location of a Thing contains information that we care about -- think of a lighthouse or a "Do Not Disturb" sign.  But even here, these things contain information by virtue of their location being correlated with some other state.  In the case of a light house, its location is correlated with nearby navigation hazards.  In the case of a do-not-disturb sign, its location (outside or inside the door) is correlated with someone's desire not to be disturbed.

The reason DNA can be said to contain information is that the sequences of base pairs in a DNA molecule correlates with the amino acid sequences -- and hence the shapes, and hence the functional properties -- of proteins.  We are nowhere near ready to actually get into biology.  I just wanted to mention that to show that this definition of information applies (or at least that it's plausible).

Note that creating information does not require intelligence.  Any physical process that causes the states of two systems to become correlated creates information.  There is an old joke about using a rock tied to a string as a weather station.  If the rock is wet, it's raining.  If the rock is moving, it's windy.  If the rock is warm, it's sunny.  This sounds funny, but it is actually true.  The rock really does contain information about the weather.  If you doubt this, consider that you can play the role of the rock.  If you stand outside, then your physical state will be correlated with the weather.  If it's raining, you will get wet.  If it's windy, your hair will get blown around.  If it is sunny, you will get warm.  And then your sensory nerves will transmit that information to your brain, where that information gets turned into knowledge about the weather.

The reason people think that information requires intelligence is that they conflate information and knowledge.  They are, of course, related, but they are not identical.  A rock or a light switch or a book or a computer monitor can contain information, but it seems a stretch to say that a light switch "knows" whether or not a light is on.  When you read a book or a blog post, information is transferred from the text into your brain, but that may or may not produce knowledge.  If you look at text written in a foreign language, the information in that text is still transferred to your brain -- you see exactly the same letter shapes as someone who does understand the language.  You have exactly as much information about the state of the system.  What you lack is a way to attach meaning to that information, to relate that information to anything other than the state of the book.

It's not just text.  A few years ago I was traveling in Africa and found a snake in our room.  That snake turned out to be a black mamba, one of the deadliest snakes in the world.  But I didn't know that until I got a guide to look at it.  I had all the information about the snake -- how big it was, what color it was -- but I didn't know it was dangerous until someone told me.

Knowledge is more than information, more than just a simple correlation between physical states.  Books contain information, but they don't know things.  Likewise, a DNA molecule contains information (about how to make a protein) but it would be weird to say (except perhaps as a metaphor) that the DNA molecule knows how to make a protein.

In fact, it's not hard to show that knowledge requires consciousness.  Consider a situation where you have momentarily forgotten where you left your car keys.  In that moment it is fair to say that you do not know where your car keys are.  But the information about where they are must still be lurking inside your brain somewhere, otherwise you wouldn't be able to recover the memory and find your keys.

Information is objective.  Knowledge is subjective.

What about belief?  Philosophers argue about this a lot.  The commonly accepted definition of knowledge among philosophers is "justified true belief".  In other words, knowledge is a kind of belief, one which cannot be false.  You can believe false things, but you can't know false things.

There are lots of problems with this definition.  The most well-known one is that the requirement to be "justified" doesn't work.  That requirement is there to prevent lucky guesses to qualify as knowledge.  To be considered knowledge, a belief has to not only be right, but it has to have a good reason why it's right.  For example, if someone says, "I know my team will win the game tomorrow" that doesn't really count as knowledge even if their team actually does win unless they can explain how they know this.  (Maybe the fix was in!)

But it turns out that justification is not enough.  Not all justifications are "valid" for transforming belief into knowledge.  For example, imagine you are walking in the desert searching for water.  You see what looks like water in the distance.  It is actually a mirage, but you don't know that.  It looks like water to you, but it isn't.  However, by pure coincidence, there is also a well in the same location where you see the mirage.  So your belief that there is water in the distance is actually true, but the reason you believe it is false.  So does this count as knowledge?  (This is called the Gettier problem, after Edmund Gettier, the philosopher who first pointed it out.)

But I want to point out a much more serious problem with the usual definition: it is circular!  In order to determine whether a belief is knowledge you have to determine whether or not it is true.  How do you do that?  Unless you know that the belief is true you can't know whether or not it is knowledge.  The whole point of distinguishing between knowledge and belief is that beliefs can be false, and we want to discharge that uncertainty.  But merely knowing is not enough.  If we believe something, that belief might be knowledge on the usual definition, but we aren't content with the mere possibility of knowing.  We yearn for certainty.  We want to not only know, we want to know that we know!  And now we are in an infinite regress.  As I've already pointed out many times, we can never be certain that reality is real, that we are not living in a simulation, and so we can never be certain that the Objective Reality Hypothesis is true, and so we can never be certain that anything we believe about reality is true.  The best we can do is to say that the Objective Reality Hypothesis is the best explanation for our subjective experience that there are chairs, and for our subjective experience that everyone agrees that there are chairs.

Even pure mathematical truths fall to this problem.  Many people believe that there are Platonic truths that can be known completely independent of any observation.  Math and logic are usually cited as examples of this.  But this too is false.  Even as obvious a "truth" as 1+1=2 is actually not at all obvious.  In the early 20th century, Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell published a monumental three-volume work called "Principia Mathematica" which was intended to put all of mathematics on a solid Platonic foundation.  It famously takes 300 pages to prove that 1+1=2.

This is probably the only reason anyone remembers Principia Mathematica.  No one actually reads it any more because, shortly after it was published, Kurt Gödel showed that what it was trying to do was actually impossible and the entire project was doomed from the start.

Another good example is Euclid's parallel postulate.  For 2000 years, Euclid's Elements was the canonical example of mathematical reasoning.  It purported to develop all of geometry from five axioms, the last of which said that given a line and a point not on that line you can draw exactly one line through the point that is parallel to the given line.  This axiom was awkwardly longer than the other four, and mathematicians tried in vain for 2000 years to prove it was true using only the other four axioms.  The reason they failed is because, despite the fact that for 2000 years no one questioned the truth of this axiom, it is not actually true.

There is in fact nothing in the entire history of alleged Platonic truths that has stood the test of time.  Again and again, things that were intuitively obvious were shown to be false.  Not even the so-called "three laws of thought and logic" stand up to scrutiny.  The "law" of the excluded middle is falsified by the Liar Paradox.  The "law" of non-contradiction is simple question-begging: the problem with contradictions is that they lead (with a few other innocuous-seeming assumptions) to all propositions being true, but this is only a problem is you assume that there exist propositions that are false, and that requires you to assume that objective reality exists.  The "law" of identity falls to the Ship of Theseus problem.

One of the beautiful things about the scientific method is that it allows us to easily cut through all of these philosophical Gordian knots simply by asking: is knowledge real?  Do we actually need it in order to explain any observations?  The answer is, no, we don't.  Remember the definition of the scientific method: Find the best explanation that accounts for all the observed data, and act as if that explanation is correct until you encounter contradictory data or a better explanation.  Note that it says nothing about truth.  The closest it comes is acting as if an explanation is correct until it is falsified or a better explanation is found.  The fact that science converges towards something is an empirical observation, not something built in to the method.  We can give a label to "the thing that science appears to converge towards" and call it the truth, but this truth is different from metaphysical Truth.  Metaphysical Truth cannot change.  Scientific truth can, with new data and better explanations.

Knowledge on this view is simply the conscious awareness of the current best explanation.  It is a subjective sensation, not an objective fact.  (Indeed, the very existence of objective facts is a hypothesis to explain the subjective sensation that we know things!)  Specifically, knowledge is the subjective sensation of certainty.  Once we are sufficiently confident in a belief, we call it "knowledge" even though there isn't a sharp distinction between the two, just as there is no sharp distinction between a hypothesis and a theory.  Once a hypothesis withstands a certain level of scrutiny, once it has passed a certain number of tests, once we are sufficiently confident in it, we call it a theory or a "fact" even though there is no bright line.

An interesting consequence of this view is that knowledge depends on context.  When "knowing" is just shorthand for "believing with very high certainty" then it is possible for people to "know" (i.e. believe with very high certainty) mutually contradictory things simply because they have different subjective experiences.  It is possible for someone to know (i.e. believe with very high certainty) that (say) the earth is 6000 years old because everyone they have contact with says so, while at the same time someone else knows (i.e. believes with very high certainty) that the earth is 4 billion years old for the exact same reason.

There is only one thing that you can even potentially know with absolute certainty and that is your own subjective experiences.  Everything else you think you know is actually nothing more than things you believe with very high certainty as a result of those experiences.

Sunday, May 03, 2026

Big News: The Plausibility of Abiogenesis Has Been Experimentally Demonstrated

From earliest recorded history mankind has wondered how life on earth first arose.  The current diversity of life on earth is spectacularly well-explained by Darwinian (or Dawkinsian) evolution, the process of replication with random variation plus natural selection.  Things that are better at making copies of themselves make more copies.  What makes something better at reproducing in one environment almost always makes it worse in a different environment.  Lungs are a big win if you live on land, gills generally work better if you live under water.  Earth has a large variety of environments, and so a variety of life has evolved to exploit them.

But this leaves a crucial question unanswered: how did this process get started?  Even the simplest living thing today is far too complicated to have arisen by pure chance.  There has been a lot of speculation and plausible hypotheses, but no actual answer.  The belief that life began as a purely naturalistic process has always required a kernel of faith.

Until now.  In the last year and a half there have been two papers published that have removed the last vestiges of reasonable doubt.  The first one was a computer model, and the second, published just three months ago, is an actual laboratory experiment.  (Here is a more accessible description.)

But before I describe these papers I want to show you a little back-of-the-envelope calculation that illustrates why they are so significant.  To kick start evolution we need to somehow make a replicator, a thing capable of making copies of itself.  In order to assess the likelihood that a replicator can arise by purely naturalistic processes we need to know two things.  First, what is the most complicated thing that could plausibly arise by pure chance, without life?  And second, what is the simplest plausible replicator?  If there is a big gap between these two, then we have a big Problem, a big gap in our explanation.

A likely candidate for a minimal replicator is an RNA molecule because RNA is a biological multi-tasker: it can both carry genetic information and catalyze chemical reactions of the sort that happen in living things.  RNA, like its close chemical cousin DNA, is a polymer, a molecule that consists of a chain of small building blocks called bases.  Both RNA and DNA have four different bases.  Three of these are the same: adenine, cytosine, and guanine.  The fourth base in DNA is thymine while in RNA it is uracil.  These are commonly abbreviated ATCG and AUCG, but these details don't really matter.  What matters is that in each case there are four different bases, and in both cases these bases are arranged in a linear sequence.  This makes it really easy to compute how many possible DNA or RNA molecules there are with a given length: it's just 4 raised to the power of the length of the chain.  (Strictly speaking you have to divide this number by two because if you take a sequence and reverse it you end up with the same molecule, but that turns out not to matter.)

It has been experimentally demonstrated that the bases that form RNA (and DNA and proteins) form spontaneously in conditions likely to have existed on earth in its early days.  It has also been experimentally demonstrated that these bases spontaneously link together to form chains.   What had not been experimentally demonstrated until now was that these spontaneously generated RNA chains could form replicators.  In fact, there seemed to be a pretty big gap between the complexity of the chains that had been formed in labs and what would be needed to self-replicate, but this was hard to assess because we didn't actually know how short a replicator could be.

It is pretty straightforward to predict what this value should be.  We start by estimating how much material we could have to work with.  Earth's current biomass, i.e. the total mass of all the organic compounds on earth is about 500 GTC (gigatons of carbon).  Note that this is only a tiny fraction of the total carbon on earth.  That figure is 1.85 billion GTC.  Only about one in a million carbon atoms on earth are part of an organic molecule.  So it is possible that the biomass of the early earth was much higher, but that will ultimately turn out not to matter.

The numbers we are about to deal with are going to get very big so it will be convenient to swtich to scientific notation.  Unfortunately, the Blogger platform doesn't make it easy to create superscripts, so I am going to use the conventional 10^X notation to denote 10 raised to the power of X.  500 GTC is 500 x 10^9 = 5x10^11 tons = 5x10^14 kilograms of carbon.  Let's be conservative and round this down to just 10^14 kg.  To get the number of carbon atoms we multiply by Avogadro's number 6x10^23, and divide by 12 (because the atomic weight of carbon is 12 —six protons and six neutrons).  Since we are just doing a very rough estimate here, we can safely ignore everything but the exponents and arrive at a final figure of (very roughly) 10^45 carbon atoms.  The RNA/DNA bases all have less than six carbon atoms, so this is enough to make 10^44 RNA/DNA bases.  Of course, not all organic molecules are RNA/DNA bases, so let's round this down to 10^40.  That's dividing by ten thousand, which seems pretty conservative.

The other thing we need to take into account is how much time we have to find a replicator.  How fast do these chemical reactions takes place?  How long does it take to stick a new base onto an RNA chain, or take one away?  We can get a rough estimate by looking at how long it takes for a living organism to reproduce.  The well-known bacteria E. coli takes about 40 minutes to reproduce, and it has 4.7 million bases in its genome.  That's about 1000 bases per second, but this is likely a serious overestimate for prebiotic earth.  Life has had billions of years to optimize its reproductive chemistry, so let's be conservative and assume that it takes a full second to build a new RNA molecule in a prebiotic earth.  There are 60x60x24x365 = 7x10^7 seconds in a year.  Again, let's be conservative and round this down to 10^7.  But then we need to multiply this by the amount of time we have to produce a replicator.  Earth is four billion years old, so if we can do it in (say) a million years that is the blink of an eye on that time scale.  So we have 10^40 bases, and 10^7 years which gives us time to do 10^14 different experiments.  Note that this is not to say that we can only try 10^14 different combinations.  All of those 10^40 bases are floating around in the primordial soup and mixing and matching and forming different sequences at the same time.  So every second we can try a huge number of combinations.  How many?  That is a little tricky to compute because we don't know how long a sequence we actually need.  Again, let's be conservative and look at the smallest currently existing natural replicators to guide us.  These are called viroids, and they have a few hundred bases.  Let's round this up to 1000.  So every second we can potentially try 10^37 different sequences.  Multiply that by 10^14 seconds and we can roll the abiogenetic dice a total of 10^50 times in a million years.

Is that enough?  If the minimal replicator that we're looking for is roughly the same size as a modern viroid, i.e. a few hundred bases, then no, it's not enough.  Not even close.  And so for a very long time the abiogenesis hypothesis relied to a certain extent on an article of faith: a replicator that is much shorter than anything that exists on earth today is possible.  Another way of looking at it is that this hypothesis made a falsifiable prediction that a much smaller replicator is possible.

For a long time there have been some good theoretical reasons for believing that shorter replicators are possible, but no actual experimental proof.  These theoretical reasons have to do with information theory and the theory of computation and a theoretical construct called a Quine.  That is a deep thicket of weeds that I want to avoid here, though it is all rather fascinating if you feel like diving in.  The bottom line is that under some not-entirely-unreasonable assumptions you can demonstrate mathematically that self-replicating systems are possible with as little as 132 bits of information, which is the equivalent of 66 base pairs.  That is easily in range of what can be achieved with 10^50 trials.  The math goes like this: suppose you have an extremely unlikely event with odds 1 in N where N is a very large number.  If you do exactly N trials then the odds that this event will occur is about 2 in 3 (the exact value is 1-1/e, about 63%).  After that the odds rise dramatically.  If you do 2N trials then the odds of the event happening are 87%.  If you do 10N trials the odds rise to over 99%.

In other words: if you do 10^50 trials, and there exists a replicator whose odds of arising by chance are better than 1 in 10^49, then you are practically guaranteed to find it.  Those are the odds for a biological replicator with about 80 base pairs (because 10^49 is approximately 4^80).

And now we have an actual experimental demonstration of an RNA replicator with 45 bases (it is called QT45).  So even if we are off in our estimate of 10^50 trials by many, many orders of magnitude (and remember that we arrived at that number by making some very conservative assumptions) it is still a virtual certainty that a replicator will arise spontaneously almost immediately (on cosmic and geological time scales) on a planet with liquid water and a biomass the size of earth's.

It is important to be clear about what this experiment actually shows.  It does not show that this is how life actually began.  It does not show that QT45 is the original replicator.  All this experiment shows is that small biological replicators are possible.  But that is enough.  If they are possible, and they are small enough (and QT45 passes the necessary threshold by a huge margin), then the spontaneous generation of replicators is inevitable.  Abiogenesis no longer requires any leaps of faith.  The details of how it actually happened are still TBD and probably always will be.  But the mere fact that a naturalistic explanation has now been demonstrated to be possible beyond any reasonable doubt completely destroys intelligent design.  As long as there was room for doubt that purely naturalistic abiogenesis was possible, there was room for a reasonable belief that some kind of intelligent designer was necessary.  But that argument has now been blown out of the water.  We no longer need to guess how small a replicator can be, nor do we need to guess how likely it was for one to arise by chance.  Now we know.

Intelligent design advocates will object to this by pointing out that this replicator did not arise in nature but was created in a lab, which was created by intelligent humans.  But this completely misses the point.  What matters here is not how this replicator was created, but the fact that it was possible to create it at all.  This replicator is almost certainly not the one that originally sparked life here on earth.  It is almost certainly not the smallest possible replicator.  It is almost certainly not the most effective replicator of its size.  It is actually not a particularly good replicator.  But it is also almost certainly not the last replicator of this size that we are going to find.  The fact that one replicator this small exists means that it is virtually certain that there are others, and that some of them will be smaller, and some of them will be better.  And yes, these things can be created simply by tossing the parts into bin and shaking them up — as long as your bin is the size of a planet and you shake for a few million years, though for obvious reasons that is not an experiment we are likely to be able to replicate.

The other paper, published last year, which demonstrated all of these things happening in a computer model is the icing on the cake.  The results here are not directly comparable to a biological system.  There are good reasons to believe that the computer model captures the dynamics of a biological system, but that is a very deep rabbit hole.  But the main takeaway is that the replicators which arose in the computer model are of comparable complexity to the QT45 replicator.

This is the last nail in the coffin of intelligent design theory.  Before these results, intelligent design could only be criticized as an argument from ignorance: just because we don't know the details of the process that produced the first replicator doesn't mean that it was not a naturalistic process.  All it means is that we have not yet worked out the details.  But now we have.  The last gap in our understanding of the naturalistic origins of life on earth has now been definitively closed.