I want to debunk once and for all this idea that "science is just another religion". It isn't, for one simple reason: all religions are based on some kind of metaphysical assumptions. Those assumptions are generally something like the authority of some source of revealed knowledge, typically a holy text. But it doesn't have to be that. It can be as simple as assuming that there must be some kind of purpose or meaning to existence, assuming that the question "Why are we here?" or "Why is there something rather than nothing?" actually has a satisfying answer. There is nothing inherently wrong with making such assumptions, but there is something wrong with trying to deny that you've made them, or assuming that everyone else has made them too.
Science makes no metaphysical assumptions. I'll often hear people say that science assumes materialism or atheism or some such thing, but that is wrong. Science is just the process of seeking explanations that account for observations. It makes no assumptions. It does not assume materialism. It does not assume the existence of objective reality. It does not assume that satisfactory explanations of observations even exist. It turns out that satisfactory explanations do exist. We know this because we have actually found them. And it turns out that these explanations do not require deities or mind-body dualism or divine revelation. All they require is the right math.
It turns out that with the right math we can account for all phenomena that are observed to occur here on earth. (I hedge with "here on earth" because we do not yet have complete explanations of some cosmological phenomena.) At the foundation of modern science is something called the Standard Model, which describes the behavior of all known fundamental particles. The predictions made by the Standard Model agree with all observations. Not a single observation of a phenomenon here on earth has ever disagreed with the predictions of the Standard Model. Indeed, this has precipitated a major crisis in theoretical physics because for the last 50 years since the Standard Model was formulated, particle physicists have had no idea what to do with themselves.
None of relies on any assumptions. It is all empirically observed fact, which you verify for yourself every time you use a piece of modern technology. Every time you use a phone or a computer you are doing an experiment that checks the predictions of the Standard Model.
Does this prove that God does not exist, or that there is no afterlife? No. Nothing is ever proven in science. Science does not produce proofs, it produces explanations. But these explanations have one very important feature: they converge. Throughout its history, the progress of science has been monotonic. Even when major revolutions have happened, when radically new explanations have displaced old ones, it turns out that the old explanations were actually reasonable approximations to the new under certain circumstances.
Whatever this thing is that science is empirically observed to be converging towards is called "scientific truth", not because science makes any claim to uncover metaphysical Truth with a capital T, but simply because it's a convenient and intuitively plausible label. We say that it is true that the earth is round, that it revolves around the sun, that it is made of atoms, despite the fact that it is possible that none of these things are metaphysically True. Indeed, the Standard Model tells us that the statement "matter is made of atoms" is just an approximation to the truth, just as Newtonian gravity is just an approximation to the truth.
But these approximations have a very important property: they are very good approximations, in the sense that they give us the ability to predict certain future events with vastly greater accuracy than any other method ever devised by man. Astrology, tarot, reading auras -- none of these even come close to the predictive power of the scientific method. (Indeed, all of these methods have more or less the same predictive power, which is to say, none at all.)
The fact that naturalistic explanations can account for all phenomena that are observed to occur here on earth, and that they give us the gift of prophecy, is hard-won knowledge, pieced together bit by bit by many thousands of people working over centuries. This progress was punctuated by major breakthroughs made by people whose names are immortalized in history: Galileo. Copernicus. Kepler. Newton. Darwin. Einstein. But there were countless others who toiled anonymously to bring this Promethean gift of knowledge to mankind. To dismiss all this hard work as "just another religion", or that "atheism requires faith" is an insult to their hard work. It is every bit as insulting as saying that Christians worship a zombie.
Science demands no faith. In fact it is the exact opposite: science demands skepticism. Science rejects arguments from authority. Science has no pope, no ecclesiastical hierarchy. Scientific academia might have such a hierarchy, but scientific academia absolutely should not be conflated with science! Science is inherently democratic. Anyone can do it. This is not to say that doing science is easy. It isn't. It requires diligence and hard work. But it does not require faith.
I was motivated to write this in part because I often hear Christians try to claim credit for the rise of science in Western Europe during the Enlightenment. As evidence they point to the fact that nearly all of the Big Names in Enlightenment science were Christians. Which is true. Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton were all devout Christians. But virtually everyone in Western Europe was a Christian at that time. Assigning the credit to Christianity is no more valid than assigning the credit to the fact that they were white men, because they were all that too.
But the history is neither here nor there. What matters now is what is happening now. And what is happening right now is that the Catholic Church just elected a pope who once
...lamented that Western news media and popular culture fostered “sympathy for beliefs and practices that are at odds with the gospel.” He cited the “homosexual lifestyle” and “alternative families comprised of same-sex partners and their adopted children.”
That is anti-scientific, not because of the position, but because of the justification: homosexuality is at odds with the Gospel. That is an argument from authority, which is as violently anti-science as you can get. So it doesn't matter if the Church was anti-science in the past or not. What matters is that it is anti-science right now. And the Church of course is not unique in this. All religions are inherently anti-science because all religions are based on some metaphysical assumptions. That is the defining characteristic of a religion. Science is unique among human intellectual endeavors. It is the only philosophical foundation that makes no assumptions. It is nothing more and nothing less than the quest to explain observation. That turns out to be an extremely powerful lever, which is why, I think, that all other philosophical traditions look on the success of science with envy and try to tear it down. If your identity or your livelihood revolves around being a person of faith, the success of science can be bad for business.
>That is anti-scientific, not because of the position, but because of the justification: homosexuality is at odds with the Gospel.
ReplyDeleteIt's not anti-scientific, it's *non-scientific.*
>That is an argument from authority, which is as violently anti-science as you can get.
A moral evaluation derived from revelation is not an attempt at empirical explanation; it is therefore *non‑scientific,* not *anti‑scientific,* just as history or jurisprudence are non‑scientific without being hostile to physics.
What is the scientific justification for homosexuality?
>All religions are inherently anti-science because all religions are based on some metaphysical assumptions.
That makes them non-scientific, like . . . history, political theory, literary criticism, aesthetics, logic, mathematics, jurisprudence, and philosophy.
>That is the defining characteristic of a religion.
That's right. Religion deals in metaphysics, while science deals with physics. Different domains of knowledge.
>Science is unique among human intellectual endeavors. It is the only philosophical foundation that makes no assumptions.
It makes assumptions. The biggest one is that science assumes the uniformity of nature -- the idea that the laws of physics today will hold tomorrow, and that past observations can guide future predictions.
>It is nothing more and nothing less than the quest to explain observation.
The claim that science is "nothing more and nothing less than the quest to explain observation" is misleading in its apparent simplicity. While it is true that science seeks to explain observations, this definition leaves out the interpretive frameworks, philosophical assumptions, and methodological choices that shape what counts as an "observation," what kind of explanation is considered valid, and why explanation matters in the first place. Observation is not a neutral or self-evident act; it is theory-laden. We do not simply "see" raw data -- we interpret sensory input through conceptual lenses, language, and expectations. Furthermore, the idea of explanation presupposes that the universe is orderly, that events follow discernible patterns, and that human reason is capable of uncovering them. These are metaphysical commitments, not empirical conclusions. Science cannot even begin its "quest" without standing on unproven assumptions about logic, causality, induction, and the reliability of our cognitive faculties. To describe science as a pure, assumption-free search for explanations is to ignore the philosophical scaffolding that makes scientific inquiry possible.
>That turns out to be an extremely powerful lever, which is why, I think, that all other philosophical traditions look on the success of science with envy and try to tear it down.
Which philosophical traditions try to tear science down? Don't most of them recognize the power and usefulness of science?
>If your identity or your livelihood revolves around being a person of faith, the success of science can be bad for business.
Why? Religious people benefit from the applications of scientific knowledge. Many religious people are scientists. You're assuming religion and science are in conflict -- the archaic *conflict thesis.*
> It's not anti-scientific, it's *non-scientific.*
DeleteChristianity is anti-scientific because it turns entirely on a physical claim: the Jesus rose from the dead, and that he will return to judge the wicked. This comes from no less an authority than Paul himself:
"And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." (1Cor15:14)
And that is far from the only physical claim that Christianity makes. For example:
"And these signs shall follow them that believe; In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." (Mark16:17-18)
That is directly from Jesus, which is to say (according to Chrisianity), directly from God.
> A moral evaluation derived from revelation is not an attempt at empirical explanation
That's right. But Christianity's moral evaluations are nonetheless grounded in physical claims. That makes them anti-scientific.
> history, political theory, literary criticism, aesthetics, logic, mathematics, jurisprudence, and philosophy.
None of these things are inherently anti-scientific or even non-scientific. History and mathematics especially can be (indeed, generally are) approached scientifically. Even literary criticism could be done that way, though I'm not aware of anyone who has ever actually attempted it. But nothing is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry.
> science assumes the uniformity of nature
No, it doesn't. It *turns out* that there *are* uniformities in nature in point of actual fact, and that is what makes the scientific method productive. But science does not *assume* this regularity.
> this definition leaves out the interpretive frameworks, philosophical assumptions, and methodological choices that shape what counts as an "observation,"
No. There is no filter for what "counts" as an observation. *Everything* counts as an observation. That is why the method specifies that explanations have to account for *all* of the data, not just some cherry-picked subset.
> We do not simply "see" raw data
That depends on what you mean by "raw data". At root, the observations you have to explain are *your* observations, your own conscious experience, because that is all you have direct access too. And yes, those are pre-processed for you by your brain and so can be very misleading. That is one of the many things that makes actually applying the scientific method challenging. But it's not a problem with the *method*, it's a problem with your *brain*. One of the many triumphs of the *method* is that it works *even* when it is done by highly fallible human brains. Indeed, even the knowledge that there are such things as brains and that these things have something to do with conscious experience is a triumph of the scientific method.
> Which philosophical traditions try to tear science down?
Any religion which makes physical claims based on revelation does this. That includes but is not limited to Christianity and Islam.
>> If your identity or your livelihood revolves around being a person of faith, the success of science can be bad for business.
> Why?
Because if your faith is rooted in physical claims, then evidence that those claims are false undermines your moral authority.
1
Delete>>It's not anti-scientific, it's *non-scientific.*
>Christianity is anti-scientific because it turns entirely on a physical claim: the Jesus rose from the dead
Christians are simply following your scientific program! Jesus was observed to be killed on a cross, was buried, and then three days later, the tomb was observed to be empty! Then Jesus appeared to them alive, even ate and drank with them. Thomas even performed an experiment to verify that it happened! It's a scientific prediction --> observation --> verification program!
The resurrection is not framed within Christianity as a repeatable biological process, but as a singular divine act that transcends natural explanation. To call it "anti-scientific" is like calling Mozart's music "anti-chemical" because chemistry alone cannot account for its aesthetic power. A miracle claim is *non-scientific* because it appeals to a cause beyond nature, not within it.
>And that is far from the only physical claim that Christianity makes. For example:
>"And these signs shall follow them that believe; In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." (Mark16:17-18)
>That is directly from Jesus, which is to say (according to Chrisianity), directly from God.
You need to keep reading your Bible. Afterwards you'll discover:
* some believers casting out demons (Acts 5:16, 8:7, 16:16-18, 19:11-12)
* some believers speaking in tongues (Acts 2:4, 10:46, 19:6, 1 Corinthians 12:10, 12:28)
* believers laying hands on the sick and healing them (Acts 9:17, 28:8)
* one believer bit by a snake and not harmed (Acts 28:3-5)
Once again we have prediction --> observation --> verification. Christians are following your program!
>> A moral evaluation derived from revelation is not an attempt at empirical explanation
>That's right. But Christianity's moral evaluations are nonetheless grounded in physical claims. That makes them anti-scientific.
The idea that a moral system is "anti-scientific" because it references physical events is confused. A historical or physical context does not turn an ethical judgment into a scientific one, nor does it subject moral claims to the same kinds of testing or falsification. Christianity's ethics are *motivated* by theological events but are not *reducible* to them. Christian moral claims are informed by events like the Resurrection, but they are not derived through empirical observation or subject to lab-based falsification. That makes them *non-scientific*, not *anti-scientific.* Science can inform our understanding of how humans behave, but it cannot determine how we *ought* to act -- that requires a moral framework, which science cannot provide.
2
Delete>But nothing is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry.
Is the assertion that "nothing is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry" something that can be tested or falsified? If not, then it's a non-scientific metaphysical claim.
Science has no test or formula for beauty, justice, or the principle of non-contradiction. These are real domains of knowledge, but they require tools other than measurement and falsifiability.
>> science assumes the uniformity of nature
>No, it doesn't. It *turns out* that there *are* uniformities in nature in point of actual fact, and that is what makes the scientific method productive. But science does not *assume* this regularity.
To say "we discovered uniformity in nature" already presumes that past observations are reliable guides to future events. That's induction. And induction cannot be justified by induction without circularity. Science works brilliantly in practice, but it relies on a philosophical assumption -- regularity -- that it cannot prove on its own terms.
>> this definition leaves out the interpretive frameworks, philosophical assumptions, and methodological choices that shape what counts as an "observation,"
>No. There is no filter for what "counts" as an observation. *Everything* counts as an observation. That is why the method specifies that explanations have to account for *all* of the data, not just some cherry-picked subset.
Observation is not neutral, but theory-laden. From the choice of instruments to the language used to describe results, observation is shaped by prior expectations, conceptual frameworks, and methodological assumptions. Scientists do not approach nature with a blank slate, passively recording whatever occurs. They bring with them hypotheses, definitions, models, and paradigms that determine what counts as data in the first place. Scientists have to make decisions about what constitutes anomalous data, statistical noise, or instrumental error, and those decisions are influenced by prior theories.
>One of the many triumphs of the *method* is that it works *even* when it is done by highly fallible human brains.
The power of science lies precisely in its ability to refine human perception through structured, *theory-guided* inquiry. The "data" does not speak for itself -- they are observed, filtered, and understood through theoretical lenses. Far from undermining science, acknowledging the theory-ladenness of observation reveals the intellectual rigor and interpretive depth that science actually requires.
> Which philosophical traditions try to tear science down?
>Any religion which makes physical claims based on revelation does this. That includes but is not limited to Christianity and Islam.
Religions that make metaphysical or miracle claims do not "tear down" science. Most accept the legitimacy of scientific inquiry in its proper sphere. Christianity, in particular, gave rise to the very conditions that made science possible: belief in order, intelligibility, and a rational human mind.
>Because if your faith is rooted in physical claims, then evidence that those claims are false undermines your moral authority.
Christianity's moral authority is not grounded in scientific validation but in a vision of human dignity, purpose, and moral order. Science can illuminate how we act, but not how we *ought* to act. The Resurrection inspires ethical transformation -- not because it is measurable in a lab, but because it testifies to a transcendent truth. That is not a scientific claim -- it's a theological one, addressed to reason, not experiment.
Delete> Christians are simply following your scientific program! Jesus was observed to be killed on a cross, was buried, and then three days later, the tomb was observed to be empty! Then Jesus appeared to them alive, even ate and drank with them. Thomas even performed an experiment to verify that it happened! It's a scientific prediction --> observation --> verification program!
Maybe. Or maybe it's all a big misunderstanding.
> The resurrection is not framed within Christianity as a repeatable biological process, but as a singular divine act that transcends natural explanation. To call it "anti-scientific" is like calling Mozart's music "anti-chemical" because chemistry alone cannot account for its aesthetic power. A miracle claim is *non-scientific* because it appeals to a cause beyond nature, not within it.
Miracle claims are anti-scientific because there is no evidence that miracles actually occur.
> You need to keep reading your Bible.
No, you need to establish that the Bible is a reliable source and not a collection of mythology. You are the one making the extraordinary claim, so the burden of proof is on you.
> The idea that a moral system is "anti-scientific" because it references physical events is confused.
But Christianity does not merely *reference* physical events, it grounds its authority in one extraordinary physical claim: that Jesus actually rose from the dead. The argument is that we should believe *because* Jesus rose from the dead. So the moral authority of Christianity turns entirely on the actual truth of this physical claim. But then you say that the resurrection is "a singular divine act that transcends natural explanation". You say this not because there is evidence for it, but rather to fend off critical inquiry. *That* is anti-scientific.
> Is the assertion that "nothing is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry" something that can be tested or falsified?
Of course. It can be falsified by exhibiting something that is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. The reason I'm so confident that you can't do that is because such a thing would have to be beyond the reach of the Standard Model, and that would win you a Nobel prize.
> To say "we discovered uniformity in nature" already presumes that past observations are reliable guides to future events.
DeleteNo, it doesn't. Science makes no assumptions. Even the *existence* of "past observations" is a *hypothesis*, not an assumption. The existence of the past is an *explanation* for the *observation* that we seem to remember things, that there seem to be records of the past (but not the future), etc. Indeed, giving a full account of our perception of time and the regularities of nature is one of the hardest problems in science.
> That's induction.
No, it isn't. The fact that you think it is induction is a reflection of your failure to understand the scientific method.
> Observation is not neutral, but theory-laden.
Sure. So what? That does not change the fact that scientific theories converge over time, and at this point they have converged to the point where there are no phenomena in our solar system that our current theories cannot account for.
> Religions that make metaphysical or miracle claims do not "tear down" science.
They do if they insist on the truth of those claims without sufficient evidence to back them up.
> Christianity's moral authority is not grounded in scientific validation
See? There's your problem right there.
> but in a vision of human dignity, purpose, and moral order.
And that moral order includes chattel slavery, homophobia, and misogyny. And the argument for this moral order is because it is ordained by God. And the reason we should believe this (according to Christians) is the resurrection.
> Science can illuminate how we act, but not how we *ought* to act.
That's not true. Science can, for example, elucidate the fact that there is absolutely nothing wrong with same-sex romantic relations, that this is perfectly natural and harmless, and that homophobia is a relic of ancient prejudices and ought to be done away with. Science can elucidate the fact that the thing that makes humans interesting and valuable is their brains, and that therefore human fetuses, which do not yet have fully developed brains, do not have as much value as fully-fledged adult humans, and so when their interests are in conflict the interests of the fully-fledged adult human with a fully developed brain ought to trump the interests of the fetus. It can also tell us that skin color is not significant distinction between humans, and so enslaving people on the basis of the color of their skin color has no rational basis. And it can also tell us that with extremely high probability, Jesus is not coming back any time soon, and so we probably ought to plan for the future.
And those are just a few examples.
3
Delete>> Christians are simply following your scientific program! ... It's a scientific prediction --> observation --> verification program!
>Maybe. Or maybe it's all a big misunderstanding. [Here my opponent links to Bart Ehrman's minimal witness hypothesis, at https://www.bartehrman.com/minimal-witnesses-hypothesis/ ]
Your linking to Bart Ehrman to undermine the resurrection account, but that's not a response to my argument. It's an alternative historical hypothesis, which we could evaluate. That doesn't speak to Christians following the prediction --> observation --> verification method.
>Miracle claims are anti-scientific because there is no evidence that miracles actually occur.
You're confusing lack of evidence with contradictory evidence. A claim is anti-scientific when it contradicts established scientific knowledge, not when it simply cannot be explained by science. A miracle is not a scientific law or regularity, but a unique event that suspends or exceeds natural patterns. You may be unconvinced by the evidence offered for such events, but that is a question of insufficient evidence, not a scientific contradiction. Lack of scientific explanation does not equal scientific refutation. It only contradicts natural law if you assume there is no God. That assumption begs the question against the very claim under evaluation.
>> You need to keep reading your Bible.
>No, you need to establish that the Bible is a reliable source and not a collection of mythology. You are the one making the extraordinary claim, so the burden of proof is on you.
Ironically, you quoted Mark16:17-18 as some physical claims Christianity makes, and I provided you with the historical references of those claims being realized -- again demonstrating the Christian prediction --> observation --> verification method.
>But then you say that the resurrection is "a singular divine act that transcends natural explanation". You say this not because there is evidence for it, but rather to fend off critical inquiry. *That* is anti-scientific.
We evaluate historical claims differently than scientific laws. Christianity’s moral authority is not based on treating the Resurrection as a repeatable scientific phenomenon, but on its historical and theological significance as a one-time event. To say it "transcends natural explanation" is not to shut down inquiry but to clarify the kind of inquiry appropriate to the claim. We evaluate unique historical claims based on testimony, coherence, explanatory power, and other methods used by historians.
4
Delete>> Is the assertion that "nothing is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry" something that can be tested or falsified?
>Of course. It can be falsified by exhibiting something that is beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. The reason I'm so confident that you can't do that is because such a thing would have to be beyond the reach of the Standard Model, and that would win you a Nobel prize.
Here are a few things beyond the reach of the scientific method:
1. The identity of the Man in the Iron Mask.
2. Is it wrong to lie?
3. Is the painting of Mona Lisa beautiful?
>> To say "we discovered uniformity in nature" already presumes that past observations are reliable guides to future events.
>No, it doesn't.
Yes it does. We generalize from past experiences to make future expectations. You cannot escape that dependency by simply calling it a "hypothesis," because any test of that hypothesis already presumes that past regularities matter.
>Science makes no assumptions.
That's a pretty extreme position, so let's apply Ron's First Law: all extreme positions are wrong. Science makes many assumptions, and practicing scientists need to be aware of what they are.
Hmm, how did Ron's First Law come about? A general pessimism or . . . oh good Lord, it was induction!!!
>> That's induction.
>No, it isn't. The fact that you think it is induction is a reflection of your failure to understand the scientific method.
Someone fails to understand the scientific method and it's not me.
For example, the branch of science that estimates the number of fish in a river is fisheries science. A Fisheries Biologist may release Rotenone to kill all the fish in an isolated stretch of river and count all of the dead fish that float to the surface. From that count, they will estimate the total number of fish in the river. That estimation process depends on induction.
So we have:
1. A Fisheries Biologist (a scientist)
2. Using an inductive method
--> conclusion: scientists -- and hence science -- uses induction.
>> Observation is not neutral, but theory-laden.
>Sure. So what?
If observations are theory-laden, then you can't cleanly separate theory from data, and every interpretation of data depends on prior conceptual commitments. Even falsification depends on theories (about measurement, instrumentation, and background assumptions). You can't isolate a single theory for falsification without touching the entire web of theories -- it involves inferential judgments based on past experience and probabilistic expectations (and where induction will come into play).
>That does not change the fact that scientific theories converge over time, and at this point they have converged to the point where there are no phenomena in our solar system that our current theories cannot account for.
Just what do you mean by "account for"? It's so ambiguous it could mean anything. What do you mean by "convergence"? What, exactly, do you think science is converging to?
5
Delete>> Religions that make metaphysical or miracle claims do not "tear down" science.
>They do if they insist on the truth of those claims without sufficient evidence to back them up.
Christianity has sufficient evidence to back them up.
>> Christianity's moral authority is not grounded in scientific validation
>See? There's your problem right there.
Since science cannot settle moral questions, it's not a problem, it's a feature.
>> but in a vision of human dignity, purpose, and moral order.
>And that moral order includes chattel slavery, homophobia, and misogyny. And the argument for this moral order is because it is ordained by God.
No, those are old pagan ideas that were overturned by Christian ethics.
>> Science can illuminate how we act, but not how we *ought* to act.
>That's not true.
It is true. You can't get an ought from is.
Furthermore, using the scientific method, you will never get an ought from is. This is because during the Enlightenment, teleology was removed from science. Science can only explain efficient causes. It can't explain final causes. This disconnected science from ethics and metaphysics, and you can't get reconnected without bringing teleology back in.
>Science can, for example, ...
This is the worst misuse of science. You're taking your moral judgments and trying to justify them with fallacious scientific-sounding arguments. You're trying to mask your moral judgments as objective truths. All manner of horrors have resulted from exactly what you're doing. Science has also been used to "scientifically justify" slavery, misogyny, and prejudice against homosexuals. Let's add "scientific Marxism" as well, as it killed 100 million people in the 20th century.
> Your linking to Bart Ehrman to undermine the resurrection account, but that's not a response to my argument. It's an alternative historical hypothesis
DeleteFirst, it is Bart Ehrman's blog, but the essay I linked to was actually written by Paul Ens. It's important to give credit where it is due, particularly for something as important as the Minimal Witnesses Hypothesis.
Second, an alternative hypothesis *is* a response to your argument. You claimed that Christians are following the scientific method because Thomas allegedly did an experiment 2000 years ago. Well, maybe he did. Or maybe that's just a story that someone made up to support a theological position. That is an alternative hypothesis that explains the data which does not invoke anything supernatural. And that makes it a *better* explanation -- unless you can show some observation that *requires* a supernatural explanation. And you can't.
> You're confusing lack of evidence with contradictory evidence.
No, I'm not. There are an infinite number of theories consistent with the evidence, including theories that invoke the supernatural. There is no evidence contradicting Invisible Pink Unicorns. The only way to rule them out is the lack of evidence for them.
> We evaluate historical claims differently than scientific laws.
Maybe *you* do, but *I* don't. There is only one scientific method, and it applies to everything, including history. Indeed, even the very *existence* of something called "the past" is a hypothesis advanced to explain observations! There is no difference between "historical science" and any other kind of science, and the common Christian trope insisting that there is just another example of Christians being anti-scientific.
> Christianity’s moral authority is not based on treating the Resurrection as a repeatable scientific phenomenon, but on its historical and theological significance as a one-time event.
OK, that's fine. There is nothing wrong with that. Donald Trump's legal authority is not based on a repeatable scientific phenomenon either, but on a historical one-time (well, two-time) event. But both Trump legal authority and Jesus's moral authority turn on whether or not those events *actually happened*. Now, I will grant that Trump being elected to the Presidency was a priori extremely improbable. But there is enough evidence that it actually happened (twice!) that I am willing to accept this. But in the case of the resurrection, the a priori odds are *much* lower and the evidence is *much* thinner. There is *vastly* more evidence that Trump won the 2020 election than there is that Jesus rose from the dead.
> To say it "transcends natural explanation" is not to shut down inquiry but to clarify the kind of inquiry appropriate to the claim.
No, to say that something "transcends natural explanation" in the absence of compelling evidence is just unadulterated bullshit. You can apply that argument to *any* crackpot claim.
> Here are a few things beyond the reach of the scientific method:
Note that you have moved the goal posts. I said that nothing is beyond the reach of scientific *inquiry*. It may well be that at some point the scientific method will fail and we will observe something that is beyond our ability to explain. But this has not yet happened, at least not inside our solar system. Certainly none of your three questions are even *close* to being counterexamples.
> You cannot escape that dependency by simply calling it a "hypothesis,"
I don't. I escape it by insisting that the hypothesis be *a good explanation*.
> Ron's First Law
You do realize that Ron's First Law was intended to be ironic humor and not an actual law of nature, right?
> That estimation process depends on induction.
DeleteNo, it doesn't. That is an *exceptionally* bad example. It doesn't even resemble induction, not even superfishally. (Sorry, I couldn't resist, that example was just so stupid.)
> every interpretation of data depends on prior conceptual commitments
Yes, that's true. That's why relativity and quantum mechanics are so hard for people to wrap their brains around, because they require rejecting prior conclusions that appear to be rock-solid (literally, in the case of QM!) Nonetheless, the fact that those conclusions *can* be rejected and *have been* rejected demonstrates that they were *not* assumptions but conclusions based on evidence, subject to being overturned by evidence.
> Just what do you mean by "account for"?
That's a great question. It means that the explanation has to be a model for all observations.
> It's so ambiguous
No, it is not at all ambiguous. It is in fact extremely precise, quite literally *mathematically* precise.
> Christianity has sufficient evidence to back them up.
Not even close. There is not a single person who 1) knew Jesus while he was alive, 2) saw Jesus after he allegedly rose from the dead and 3) wrote an account of that experience and put his name on it. Not one. The *only* person to write a first-hand non-anonymous account of seeing the risen Jesus is Paul, and he never saw Jesus while he was alive. (Which immediately raises the question: even if we grant that everything Paul recounts actually happened and was not some kind of hallucination, how could Paul know that what he was experiencing was the risen Jesus and not, say, Loki pretending to be Jesus?)
> those are old pagan ideas
So... Leviticus is pagan?
> You can't get an ought from is.
Yes, you can.
6
ReplyDelete> Your linking to Bart Ehrman to undermine the resurrection account, but that's not a response to my argument.. . .
>Second, an alternative hypothesis *is* a response to your argument. You claimed that Christians are following the scientific method because Thomas allegedly did an experiment 2000 years ago. Well, maybe he did.
An alternative hypothesis doesn't refute the methodological structure of the Thomas account. My claim was that Christians were following a recognizable prediction–observation–verification pattern in their narrative. If you want to deny that, you'd have to argue that the structure of inquiry was absent, not merely propose a different account of what happened.
>Or maybe that's just a story that someone made up to support a theological position. That is an alternative hypothesis that explains the data which does not invoke anything supernatural.
It's just another heresy in a long line of heresies. You should read [Heresies: The Image of Christ in the Mirror of Heresy and Orthodoxy from the Apostles to the Present, by Harold O.J. Brown](https://www.amazon.com/Heresies-Christ-Orthodoxy-Apostles-Present/dp/0801009537), which will show you how these heresies reveal more about the social, cultural, and spiritual biases of their interpreters than about the historical Jesus.
>And that makes it a *better* explanation
How do you define "better" in this context? If you mean it's naturalistic, then you're just assuming in advance that supernatural explanations are ruled out, and that's not an evaluation, it's a philosophical veto. If we're talking about explanatory scope, coherence with contextual data, and causal adequacy, then the Resurrection hypothesis has serious advantages: it explains the rapid emergence of the early Church, the disciples' radical transformation, and the historical claims made within living memory of the events. Your alternative assumes legendary development or deception, but that too is a substantial explanatory burden. So why should we treat it as better?
>> You're confusing lack of evidence with contradictory evidence.
>No, I'm not. There are an infinite number of theories consistent with the evidence, including theories that invoke the supernatural. There is no evidence contradicting Invisible Pink Unicorns. The only way to rule them out is the lack of evidence for them.
The issue isn't whether an infinite number of logically possible explanations exist (of course they do). The question is whether the best explanation of the data must exclude the supernatural simply because it is supernatural. Invoking the IPU trope falsely equates deliberately absurd, ad hoc constructs with historically embedded claims supported by testimonial and contextual evidence. The Resurrection is not posited as a random supernatural hypothesis tacked onto unexplained data; it emerges from a coherent theological narrative, rooted in a specific historical tradition, and claimed by multiple witnesses within that immediate context.
> My claim was that Christians were following a recognizable prediction–observation–verification pattern in their narrative.
DeleteBut that's not true. *One* figure in Christian mythology exhibited skepticism on *one* occasion, and even then Thomas is not the hero, he's the villain! Jesus *rebukes* Thomas for his skepticism, telling him "Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." Christianity celebrates *faith*, not skepticism. It is anti-scientific to its very core.
> How do you define "better"
An explanation that includes unnecessary elements is worse than one that does not. Supernatural explanations are not excluded a priori, but the supernatural element(s) have to be *necessary* to explain some observation. It *turns out* that supernatural explanations are not necessary to explain any observations.
7
ReplyDelete>> We evaluate historical claims differently than scientific laws.
>Maybe *you* do, but *I* don't. There is only one scientific method, and it applies to everything, including history.
Not only are there multiple scientific methods, none of them apply to history.
>Indeed, even the very *existence* of something called "the past" is a hypothesis advanced to explain observations!
You need to go outside and touch grass. You've gotten so extreme in your views. The "past" is a necessary presupposition for reasoning about any evidence at all. We do not usually test whether the past exists because that would undermine all inquiry itself.
>There is no difference between "historical science" and any other kind of science, and the common Christian trope insisting that there is just another example of Christians being anti-scientific.
"Historical science" are fields like geology, paleontology, and archaeology.
The study of human history has methodological and epistemological differences from science. The study of history relies heavily on documents, eyewitness accounts, contextual analysis, and interpretive frameworks. It cannot be treated like an experimental science or even a historical science in the scientific sense because, 1) human history often depends on unique, non-repeatable events, 2) It uses hermeneutic and critical methods to evaluate sources, and 3) its evidentiary standards include corroboration, motive, bias, and oral tradition.
>> To say it "transcends natural explanation" is not to shut down inquiry but to clarify the kind of inquiry appropriate to the claim.
>No, to say that something "transcends natural explanation" in the absence of compelling evidence is just unadulterated bullshit. You can apply that argument to *any* crackpot claim.
To say something "transcends natural explanation" is not a license to believe anything without scrutiny. It's a way of clarifying the limits of naturalistic inquiry, not abandoning inquiry altogether. It doesn't mean it's immune to historical scrutiny. It simply acknowledges that if the event occurred, it was not the result of a repeatable physical mechanism. That doesn't make the claim "crackpot", it makes it exceptional, and therefore assessed by historical and philosophical tools, not the scientific method.
If you think all non-natural claims are equally implausible, then you're committed to [scientism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism).
>> Here are a few things beyond the reach of the scientific method:
>Note that you have moved the goal posts. I said that nothing is beyond the reach of scientific *inquiry*.
How does one perform scientific inquiry except by applying the scientific method (especially since you think there is only one method)?
>It may well be that at some point the scientific method will fail and we will observe something that is beyond our ability to explain. But this has not yet happened, at least not inside our solar system. Certainly none of your three questions are even *close* to being counterexamples.
Then perhaps you could elucidate how the scientific method, or scientific "inquiry", answers those three questions.
> Not only are there multiple scientific methods, none of them apply to history.
DeleteThere is only one scientific method, and it can be applied to everything. It is not applied to history as much as it can be or should be, but that is not the fault of the method, it's the fault of historians.
> The "past" is a necessary presupposition
No, it isn't. It's a hypothesis, and, like any hypothesis, it is open to question.
> To say something "transcends natural explanation" is not a license to believe anything without scrutiny.
It's not *necessarily* such a license. The problem is that in practice it often is such a license because it turns out that nothing transcends natural explanation. So given our current knowledge, saying that something transcends natural explanation is simply false, and to insist on its being true is *precisely* a license to believe anything without scrutiny.
> How does one perform scientific inquiry except by applying the scientific method (especially since you think there is only one method)?
That's the way. But it's not guaranteed to succeed.
> Then perhaps you could elucidate how the scientific method, or scientific "inquiry", answers those three questions.
Like I said, the scientific method is not guaranteed to succeed. It probably won't tell you what Julius Caesar had for breakfast before crossing the Rubicon either. But I don't think the Bible will be much help here either.
8
ReplyDelete>> That estimation process depends on induction.
>No, it doesn't. That is an *exceptionally* bad example. It doesn't even resemble induction, not even superfishally.
Now we have uncovered the problem. Apparently you don't understand what [induction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning) is, or you have your own private Ron-specific definition of induction. My example was an excellent example of applied statistical generalization, which is an inductive inference. For a modern treatment of induction, see [The Material Theory of Induction, by John D. Norton](https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/material_theory/Material_Induction_March_14_2021.pdf). From the Prolog, "Chapter 1 states the basic propositions of the material theory of induction. The vehicle to
develop them is Marie Curie's inference from the crystallographic properties of her sample of
radium chloride to those of all possible samples. It is an instance of enumerative induction of
breathtaking scope. It depends on the evidence of just a few specks of the only sample of radium
chloride then known. This chapter also shows how the material theory can warrant successful
inferences of this form, even if of breathtaking scope, by displaying the underlying facts that
warrant them."
So we have:
1) Marie Curie was a scientist
2) she used induction
conclusion: scientists use induction.
>> Just what do you mean by "account for"?
>That's a great question. It means that the explanation has to be a model for all observations.
>> It's so ambiguous
>No, it is not at all ambiguous. It is in fact extremely precise, quite literally *mathematically* precise.
Here is why it is ambiguous. One might expect an explanation to have an ontological dimension, a semantic dimension, and an epistemological dimension. The ontological dimension concerns what the explanation claims exists: whether it posits real, mind-independent entities or structures in the world. The semantic dimension concerns how the explanation's claims are to be understood: whether its language is meant to be taken literally as describing reality. The epistemological dimension concerns whether the explanation is a source of genuine knowledge: whether its claims, if true, actually tell us something reliable about the world.
When you say that "account for" is mathematically precise, you're reducing explanation to model fit -- that is, whether a mathematical structure aligns with data. But mathematical modeling alone does not determine whether an explanation succeeds across these three dimensions. A model might fit data yet fail ontologically (e.g., by positing entities no one believes are real), semantically (e.g., if its terms have no clear referents), or epistemologically (e.g., if it predicts well but provides no genuine insight into causality or structure).
For example, both Ptolemaic epicycles and Copernican heliocentrism "accounted for" planetary motion in mathematical terms, but only one was ultimately taken to describe the world truthfully. The difference wasn't just in precision but in explanatory depth and ontological commitment. So when you say “account for,” are you referring to empirical adequacy alone? Predictive utility? Truth-tracking? Causal intelligibility? These are distinct standards, and unless you clarify which you mean, the term remains ambiguous.
Furthermore, you crow about "mathematically precise" models, but scientific models have a lot of abstractions and idealizations of the natural world. So they aren't mathematically precise for the actual world, but a simplified version of it.
> My example was an excellent example of applied statistical generalization
DeleteNo, it wasn't. Your example was:
> A Fisheries Biologist may release Rotenone to kill all the fish in an isolated stretch of river and count all of the dead fish that float to the surface.
This assumes that rotenone kills all the fish, and that all the dead fish float to the surface. Both of those things might be true, but you can't conclude either one by induction.
> When you say that "account for" is mathematically precise, you're reducing explanation to model fit
No. You really need to pay closer attention. I am reducing "account for" to model fit. I am absolutely not reducing *explanation* to model fit. A scientific hypothesis has *two* criteria: it has to be a good explanation *and* it has to account for (i.e. be a good model for) the data. Those are two different things.
> Ptolemaic epicycles ... "accounted for" planetary motion
That's right. Epicycles were a good model but a bad explanation.
> scientific models ... aren't mathematically precise
The Standard Model is extremely precise. Models of more complex systems make simplifying assumptions, but only because there are limits to our ability to wrangle the math, not because the scientific method itself has limits.
9
ReplyDelete>> You can't get an ought from is.
>Yes, [you can](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation).
Axelrod didn't bridge the gap from is to ought. Leaving aside that subsequent research contradicted his results and the whole idea was a dead end, Axelrod only explains how certain behaviors that resemble moral norms can evolve, not whether we ought to follow them.
In other words, Axelrod shows how cooperation can be advantageous, not why it is morally obligatory. You can model how fairness or reciprocity emerges, but the normative force -- why someone should cooperate even when it's not in their immediate interest -- can't be derived from game theory or evolutionary history. These models explain why cooperation might persist, not why betrayal is wrong.
Hume's point stands: you cannot logically derive an "ought" (a [normative](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics) prescription) from a set of purely descriptive premises about what is. To go from "people who cooperate tend to flourish" to "people ought to cooperate," you must import a moral premise -- such as "we ought to do what helps groups flourish." If you're claiming that evolutionary biology can generate moral obligation on its own, without presupposing any moral standard, then you're not just wrong, you're committing the exact logical fallacy Hume warned against.
> Axelrod shows how cooperation can be advantageous, not why it is morally obligatory
DeleteMoral obligation is *exactly* what Axelrod shows. Any moral system that is not an evolutionarily stable strategy will go extinct. What else could "moral obligation" possibly mean?
>> A Fisheries Biologist may release Rotenone to kill all the fish in an isolated stretch of river and count all of the dead fish that float to the surface.
ReplyDelete>This assumes that rotenone kills all the fish, and that all the dead fish float to the surface. Both of those things might be true, but you can't conclude either one by induction.
That's not the especially inductive part. The inductive part is extrapolating from the observed sample (dead fish floating) to the entire fish population in that river. While you correctly note assumptions that Rotenone kills all fish and that dead fish surface are themselves empirically grounded generalizations based on prior repeated observations, they too depend on induction.
>No. You really need to pay closer attention. I am reducing "account for" to model fit. I am absolutely not reducing *explanation* to model fit. A scientific hypothesis has *two* criteria: it has to be a good explanation *and* it has to account for (i.e. be a good model for) the data. Those are two different things.
You're back to vagueness with "good explanation" and "good model". Just what makes them "good"?
>> scientific models ... aren't mathematically precise [for the actual world, but a simplified version of it.]
>The Standard Model is extremely precise. Models of more complex systems make simplifying assumptions, but only because there are limits to our ability to wrangle the math, not because the scientific method itself has limits.
The fact that a model is "extremely precise" doesn't mean it is ontologically complete or epistemically complete. The Standard Model is remarkably accurate within its domain, but that domain is narrow: it doesn't incorporate gravity, dark matter, or dark energy. It is hopeless for emergent complexities like consciousness, ethics, or history.
Moreover, the idealizations and approximations used in more complex systems (fluid dynamics, climate modeling, biological systems, etc.) aren't just due to "math wrangling" difficulties. They reflect fundamental constraints: the real world is messy, nonlinear, and often intractable to closed-form solutions. These aren't just computational obstacles, they reveal limits in what science can formally describe and predict.
The deeper problem is methodological: science advances by abstracting complex realities into structured, observable, and often formalized terms. But this abstraction comes at a cost: whether it's through mathematical modeling, controlled experimentation, or data reduction, some aspects of reality (especially moral, historical, or subjective ones) resist being fully captured in these terms. Not everything that matters can be meaningfully reduced to variables, systematically observed, or completely described.
>> Axelrod shows how cooperation can be advantageous, not why it is morally obligatory
>Moral obligation is *exactly* what Axelrod shows. Any moral system that is not an evolutionary stable strategy will go extinct. What else could "moral obligation" possibly mean?
You're confusing *evolutionary success* with *moral justification.* Just because a behavior helps a group persist doesn't make it morally right. Racism, sexism, slavery, xenophobia, polygamy, and homophobia have at times been evolutionary advantageous. Are you prepared to say those are therefore moral obligations? Axelrod doesn't give you a normative "ought" -- at best, he gives you a strategic "is." That's exactly Hume's point: you need an independent moral premise to move from a description to a norm.
Delete> That's not the especially inductive part. The inductive part is extrapolating from the observed sample (dead fish floating) to the entire fish population in that river.
That too depends on whether the fish are evenly distributed in the river.
Induction is an invalid form of reasoning, so trying to come up with an example of induction producing a valid result is hopeless.
> You're back to vagueness with "good explanation" and "good model". Just what makes them "good"?
It's quite simple: a good explanation includes only the minimal features needed to explain the data. A corollary of this is that a good explanation is hard to change without destroying its explanatory power. This is why epicycles are a bad explanation: you can always add another epicycle, and by doing that you can fit any curve, not just planetary orbits. You can draw Homer Simpson using epicycles (because epicycles are just a Fourier transform).
> The fact that a model is "extremely precise" doesn't mean it is ontologically complete or epistemically complete.
Yes, that's true, but irrelevant because I was specifically replying to your claim that "scientific models ... aren't mathematically precise".
The Standard Model plus Newtonian gravity is ontologically complete for all phenomena in our solar system. They can't epistemically complete. Nothing can because there are stochastic process and quantum randomness.
> The Standard Model is remarkably accurate within its domain, but that domain is narrow:
No, it isn't. It covers all known phenomena within our solar system.
> it doesn't incorporate gravity,
True, but that's easy to add. As long as you don't need quantum gravity (and in our solar system you don't) the SM + GR are, as far as we can tell, complete and correct for everything that happens in our solar system.
> dark matter, or dark energy
Those don't have measurable effects in our solar system.
> It is hopeless for emergent complexities like consciousness, ethics, or history.
DeleteNo, it isn't. It might not be possible to apply the SM *directly* but it constrains the approximations that we make to deal with more complex phenomena.
> Moreover, the idealizations and approximations used in more complex systems (fluid dynamics, climate modeling, biological systems, etc.) aren't just due to "math wrangling" difficulties. They reflect fundamental constraints: the real world is messy, nonlinear, and often intractable to closed-form solutions. These aren't just computational obstacles, they reveal limits in what science can formally describe and predict.
Sure. So? It's true that there are some things we will probably never know, like what Julius Caesar had for breakfast the day he crossed the Rubicon. But we can still be very confident that Julius Caesar existed, that he did not teleport across the Rubicon, the pyramids were not built by aliens, and neither Lazarus nor Jesus nor the many people mentioned in Matthew 27:52-53 actually rose from the dead.
> The deeper problem is methodological: science advances by abstracting complex realities into structured, observable, and often formalized terms. But this abstraction comes at a cost: whether it's through mathematical modeling, controlled experimentation, or data reduction, some aspects of reality (especially moral, historical, or subjective ones) resist being fully captured in these terms. Not everything that matters can be meaningfully reduced to variables, systematically observed, or completely described.
Sure. But that does not give you license to just make shit up and call it the truth.
> You're confusing *evolutionary success* with *moral justification.*
No, I'm equating evolutionary *necessity* with moral justification. A moral system *must* be an evolutionarily stable strategy as a consequence of the laws of physics. That is a fact that not even God can change.
> Just because a behavior helps a group persist doesn't make it morally right. Racism, sexism, slavery, xenophobia, polygamy, and homophobia have at times been evolutionary advantageous. Are you prepared to say those are therefore moral obligations?
No, because none of those things are necessary to produce an evolutionarily stable strategy.
10
ReplyDelete>> That's not the especially inductive part. The inductive part is extrapolating from the observed sample (dead fish floating) to the entire fish population in that river.
>That too depends on whether the fish are evenly distributed in the river.
That's tangential to the fact the fisheries scientist is performing induction when extrapolating from the observed sample to the entire fish population.
>Induction is an invalid form of reasoning, so trying to come up with an example of induction producing a valid result is hopeless.
The use of induction produces valid results every day. As in the use of statistical sampling and extrapolation above. Such as when Marie Curie determined by crystalline structure of radium chloride from her tiny sample.
These don’t guarantee truth, but they yield reliable, actionable knowledge. Denying their validity wholesale ignores how science operates.
>It's quite simple: a good explanation includes only the minimal features needed to explain the data. A corollary of this is that a good explanation is hard to change without destroying its explanatory power.
Your parroting of Deutsch’s "hard to vary+ criterion isn’t nearly as rigorous as you seem to think. While Deutsch’s "hard to vary" criterion tries to distill what makes a good explanation robust, your invocation of it lacks the nuance it needs to work. How exactly is "variation" being assessed? It’s hand-wavy and under-specified: hard to vary how? Mathematically? Ontologically? Narratively? Linguistically? It sounds precise, but it’s more rhetorical than functional. Worse, it fails at its main job: distinguishing true from false theories. Plenty of false theories (like geocentrism or caloric theory) were rigid and difficult to modify. Plenty of true ones (like quantum mechanics or evolutionary theory) have modifiable components and multiple competing formulations. So "hard to vary" can’t do the work you’re assigning to it.
It also falls apart in any domain more complex than physics. In biology, history, or psychology, theories must be flexible because the systems they describe are noisy, layered, and underdetermined. A theory’s rigidity isn’t a mark of truth, it’s often a sign of artificial constraints or overfitting. And even in physics, elegant minimalism doesn’t guarantee ontological accuracy. Deutsch’s slogan works as a bit of philosophical branding, but it doesn’t save you from the hard work of justifying which explanation is actually true.
>> That too depends on whether the fish are evenly distributed in the river.
Delete> That's tangential to the fact the fisheries scientist is performing induction when extrapolating from the observed sample to the entire fish population.
No, it isn't. Extrapolating from the local dead fish to the entire river cannot be justified inductively.
> The use of induction produces valid results every day.
No, it doesn't. You are confusing *valid* results with *correct* results. Invalid results are not necessarily incorrect. Stopped clocks show the correct time twice a day. Throwing darts at the stock pages produces a net positive return most of the time.
> These don’t guarantee truth
That's right. That is exactly the point.
> your invocation of it lacks the nuance
That's a limitation of the medium. Blog comments generally lack nuance because they have to be short. (Tweets have the same problem.)
> it fails at its main job: distinguishing true from false theories
No, that is not its main job. Its main job is distinguishing *good explanations* from *bad explanations*.
Your fixation on truth shows clearly that you still don't understand how the scientific method works. Scientific theories are not generally true. Of the two crown jewels of science, QFT and GR, we know with 100% certainty that at least one of them is not true, and it's quite possible that neither one is true. They are both nonetheless the current best explanations. Between them they explain all phenomena observed in our solar system. They are *almost certainly very good approximations* to the truth, at least under the circumstances that obtain in our solar system. That's the best we can do at the moment, and it ain't bad.
> In biology, history, or psychology, theories must be flexible because the systems they describe are noisy, layered, and underdetermined.
No. Theories in those areas are often flexible because we just don't yet have a clue, or because our ability to do the math or gather the data is limited. But these are limitations of our intellect and our technology, not limitations of the scientific method.
11
ReplyDelete>The Standard Model plus Newtonian gravity is ontologically complete for all phenomena in our solar system.
How could you possibly know this? You’re conflating *predictive adequacy* with *ontological completeness.* Your claim that the Standard Model plus Newtonian gravity is ontologically complete for all phenomena in our solar system is ultimately an inductive inference. You observe that these theories have so far explained everything we’ve tested, and from that you generalize their completeness. But induction is always provisional -- past success doesn’t guarantee future or absolute completeness. We cannot rule out the possibility of phenomena or deeper theories that go beyond current models. So asserting ontological completeness based on current evidence oversteps what induction can justify and remains open to revision as new data emerges.
>> The Standard Model is remarkably accurate within its domain, but that domain is narrow:
>No, it isn't. It covers all known phenomena within our solar system.
>> it doesn't incorporate gravity,
>True, but that's easy to add. As long as you don't need quantum gravity (and in our solar system you don't) the SM + GR are, as far as we can tell, complete and correct for everything that happens in our solar system.
About a quadrillion neutrinos are passing through my body every second, and the Standard Model doesn't have a model for their mass (although they're working on an extension of the model).
Also, it can't explain this. Or, to quote Erwin Schrodinger (from *Nature and the Greeks*, 1954):
*"The scientific picture of the real world around me is very deficient. It gives a lot of factual information, puts all our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but it is ghastly silent about all that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us... It knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously."
>> It is hopeless for emergent complexities like consciousness, ethics, or history.
>No, it isn't. It might not be possible to apply the SM *directly* but it constrains the approximations that we make to deal with more complex phenomena.
It other words, it's hopeless.
>> The Standard Model plus Newtonian gravity is ontologically complete for all phenomena in our solar system.
Delete> How could you possibly know this?
Because if it were not true it would be Big News.
> the Standard Model doesn't have a model for [neutrino] mass
The SM has about 20 free parameters which have to be determined by measurement. This is not a deficiency in the SM, at least not relative to any viable competitor.
> it can't explain this
How could you possibly know this? Just because we have not *yet* figured out how to explain it to your full satisfaction doesn't mean it can't be done.
> It other words, it's hopeless.
What??? No, of course not! Everything seems impossible before someone figures out how to do it.
12
ReplyDelete>> they reveal limits in what science can formally describe and predict.
>Sure. So?
So, we learn some things using *non-scientific methods.*
>>Not everything that matters can be meaningfully reduced to variables, systematically observed, or completely described.
>Sure. But that does not give you license to just make shit up and call it the truth.
You're confusing epistemic humility with license to "make things up." Acknowledging that some aspects of reality -- like moral truths, subjective experiences, or historical singularities -- resist reduction to quantifiable models isn't an evasion of rigor; it's an honest recognition of methodological boundaries. The irony is that you’re the one drawing sweeping metaphysical conclusions (e.g. "the Standard Model is ontologically complete") from limited empirical data, while accusing others of fabricating claims. The scientific method isn’t a universal veto on non-natural claims -- it’s a tool with a specific domain, not a worldview with unlimited jurisdiction.
>> You're confusing *evolutionary success* with *moral justification.*
>No, I'm equating evolutionary *necessity* with moral justification. A moral system *must* be an evolutionary stable strategy as a consequence of the laws of physics. That is a fact that not even God can change.
> Just because a behavior helps a group persist doesn't make it morally right. Racism, sexism, slavery, xenophobia, polygamy, and homophobia have at times been evolutionary advantageous. Are you prepared to say those are therefore moral obligations?
>No, because none of those things are necessary to produce an evolutionary stable strategy.
Your argument is so disconnected from reason that I'm unsure to critique it or express concerns for its origin.
You're confusing adaptive success with normative justification. If moral systems are nothing more than evolutionary stable strategies, then racism, sexism, slavery, xenophobia, and polygamy -- all of which have been extremely successful across most of human history -- must be seen as morally obligatory whenever they conferred survival advantage. Do you actually want to defend that?
Worse, your framework makes moral obligation a moving target, wholly contingent on environmental pressures that are historically accidental and often brutal. If climate shifts or resource scarcity make cruelty adaptive again, does that mean cruelty becomes moral? Your "laws of physics" don’t deliver moral facts—they deliver what survives.
You can't get moral truths from observing nature (see Nonmoral Nature).
What does your application of the laws of physics to evolution have to say about, say, "Truth"? Is Truth the result of a necessary evolutionary stable strategy?
Yet your argument is a great example of how Popper was wrong about the scientific method. Scientists don't abandon their theories or hypothesis' when contradictory data falsifies them. Instead, they introduce *ad hoc* modifications to save the theory from refutation (e.g., Galileo's ad hoc explanations of telescope anomalies, Ptolemaic epicycles, Einstein's cosmological constant, inflation in cosmology). So here you are, equipped with only the laws of physics and evolution, trying to explain moral obligations with little ad hoc modifications to your theories.
ReplyDelete> we learn some things using non-scientific methods.
Sure. So? That doesn't mean that the things we learn by those methods are *true* or *reliable*.
> You're confusing epistemic humility with license to "make things up." Acknowledging that some aspects of reality -- like moral truths, subjective experiences, or historical singularities -- resist reduction to quantifiable models isn't an evasion of rigor; it's an honest recognition of methodological boundaries.
No, it isn't. It's throwing in the towel. Worse, it's throwing in the towel on other people's behalf. Just because *you* don't see or understand how science can address morality, qualia, and history doesn't mean that other people suffer from the same lack of imagination.
BTW, your "epistemic humility" is a joke. Your claim to moral authority rests on the allegation of having access to the Word of God, which in turn rests on a body of literature which is *plainly* mythological. (Zombies wandering the streets of Jerusalem? Seriously???) That is not "epistemic humility", it is hubris of the first water.
> You're confusing adaptive success with normative justification.
No, I'm not. *You* are confusing *physical* necessity with *moral* necessity. I have identified -- using the scientific method! -- a criterion that all moral systems must obey (at the cost of extinction if they do not). It does not follow that it is morally necessary to do everything that fails to run afoul of this constraint (like practicing homophobia).
I don't claim that Axelrod's analysis of how morality arises from natural processes is complete. I don't even claim that it is *correct*. I think it mostly is, but what I am claiming here does not turn on that. All I am claiming is that, contrary to your constant insistence to the contrary, this is a question that is amenable to scientific inquiry.
> You can't get moral truths from observing nature (see Nonmoral Nature).
You can. I have give you an example.
> What does your application of the laws of physics to evolution have to say about, say, "Truth"?
I have written not one but two complete blog posts about this, one of which was *literally* entitled "A Scientific Theory of Truth". If you keep asking questions that show that you have not bothered to read what I have already written then I am going to stop publishing your comments. Go do your fucking homework, Publius.
13
ReplyDeleteLet's begin with a simple point: induction works and I've given several examples. Those are not only a legitimate use of inductive reasoning -- it's foundational to modern science. Statistics, as a field, was developed precisely to deal with this kind of inference used in fish population studies. We routinely use samples to estimate population parameters, with mathematically defined margins of error and confidence intervals. You can't discredit inductive inference without undermining the entire apparatus of empirical science.
Your claim that I confuse "valid" with "correct," misses the point entirely. I'm not arguing for deductive certainty, nor are scientists. Inductive reasoning isn't deductively valid, and no one claims otherwise. But it is rational and reliable. That's why we trust weather forecasts, drug trials, and bridge designs. Your analogy to a stopped clock being right twice a day is misleading. That's coincidence without causality. Induction is grounded in repeated, structured observations with causal or statistical support. If that doesn't count as producing "valid results," you're redefining "valid" into uselessness.
This same inconsistency recurs when you switch between truth and usefulness. One moment, science is a truth-tracker; the next, it's merely a tool for generating "good explanations." You mock my interest in truth as a "fixation," but when pressed, you admit that our best scientific theories -- like General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory -- are "almost certainly false," even as they dominate our explanatory paradigms.
This is structurally identical to the prefix paradox in epistemology: like the author who confidently asserts each claim in their book, while admitting in the preface that some claims are likely false, you're claiming that science is the most reliable set of beliefs we can hold, while acknowledging that many are wrong.
So, if science aims at truth, then its claims should be judged by that standard. But if it doesn't -- if it merely gives us useful approximations -- then it cannot be the sole path to truth. You can't lean on scientific realism when attacking religion, ethics, or history, then retreat to instrumentalism when your own house is questioned. Choose a lane.
Now let's consider your dismissal of biology, psychology, and history as flexible fields merely because "we don't yet have a clue" or lack the tools to gather the data. That's an overconfident, reductionist error. These domains are flexible not just because of technological limitations, but because the systems they study are fundamentally different in kind. They involve intentional agents, path-dependence, emergent properties, and layered causalities. They're not just noisy physics problems. They are complex systems that require different explanatory frameworks.
Your assumption -- that all complexity is merely epistemic, not ontological -- is not a scientific conclusion. It's a philosophical assertion. And it is not universally accepted even among naturalists. To assume that every question can be answered using the methods of physics is not just hubris; it's a category mistake.
15
ReplyDeleteEven when confronted with this, you retreat to the promise of future progress: "Just because we can't explain it yet doesn't mean we never will." But this isn't an argument, it's a profession of faith. You mocked the resurrection of Jesus by saying "Zombies in Jerusalem? Seriously?" but offered no substantive analysis -- just incredulity. And when I pointed out that the Standard Model of physics cannot explain emergent, cultural artifacts like Beethoven's 9th Symphony, your reply boiled down to: "Well, maybe someday." This is wishful thinking, not a reasoned defense.
Beethoven's symphony is a structured artifact of historical, aesthetic, and human intentionality. Physics can explain the ink, the vibrations, and the auditory mechanics -- but not the creative structure, thematic choices, or human resonance. That's not an implementation problem -- it's an explanatory mismatch. You confuse the substrate with the meaning, and reduce explanation to description of parts. If your reasoning held, then explaining the difference between a symphony and silence would require nothing but listening to quantum field interactions. That would tell you nothing about melody, rhythm, or human experience. Matter and energy provide the medium, not the message. The Standard Model is irrelevant to explaining Beethoven's symphony.
The same reductionist fallacy underlies your attempts to reduce ethics to evolutionary game theory. You cite Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation as a model of how morality emerges. Yet that model has since been falsified in follow-up research. Worse, even when it did seem promising, it was never a moral justification -- only an evolutionary explanation. You're confusing survivability with rightness. The fact that a trait evolves doesn't make it ethical. That's the is–ought gap, and scientific reductionism hasn't bridged it.
More than that, the moral systems that have emerged historically -- including racism, sexism, slavery, and xenophobia -- often enhanced survival. They passed your Darwinian filter. Are we then to conclude they were morally justified? Of course not. That's why your "scientific morality" collapses into either relativism or nihilism. You end up endorsing the very atrocities you claim to oppose, simply because they proved evolutionarily stable.
16
ReplyDeleteYour refusal to seriously engage non-scientific knowledge sources -- philosophy, theology, literature, history -- only reinforces the impression that scientism is not a rational stance, but an ideological one. You dismiss the New Testament as "plainly mythological," revealing more about your intellectual echo chamber than the texts themselves. It is a theory that zips past Planet America every fifty years or so, like a comet, then fades away until a new generation of nutters tries to resuscitate it. The Jesus-myth thesis you appear to accept is almost universally rejected among credentialed historians -- atheist, agnostic, and religious alike. You claim to have studied the Bible for 40 years, but obviously lazily, not seriously.
And then there's your final refuge: the claim that you've discovered a scientific theory of truth. Except . . . you haven't. You've re-invented the correspondence theory of truth, which philosophers have discussed for over two millennia. You fail to relate it to the laws of physics, evolution, or to address how it applies to abstract, moral, or historical claims. Then, when challenged, you resort to condescension and profanity: "Go do your fucking homework." I did. I read your blog. And I responded with detailed critiques. You didn't engage them -- you dismissed them.
In sum, your arguments are not scientific, they're ideological. It rests on three core moves:
1. Assert science as the only path to truth.
2. Retreat to fallibilism or utility when challenged.
3. Dismiss other domains of knowledge without understanding them.
You present this as rational empiricism. But it functions more like a creed: an article of faith in the supremacy of one method, immune to critique and blind to its assumptions.
You say science not a religion -- but you treat it like one.
> Your refusal to seriously engage non-scientific knowledge sources -- philosophy, theology, literature, history
DeleteI'm happy to seriously engage with all of those things. The thing I'm not happy to do is to unquestioningly accept those things as *knowledge sources*. And I'm even willing to accept history as a knowledge source when it's done according to the scientific method, which it usually actually is.
The other three, not so much.
> the claim that you've discovered a scientific theory of truth
Where did I claim that?
"Do your homework" means you have to actually read the text, not just the title. I did not claim to have "discovered" anything. The word "discover" doesn't even appear anywhere in the text.
> Assert science as the only path to truth.
Here is a quote from the essay that I told you to read:
"Note that what I mean by "truth" here in this chapter -- and only this chapter -- is not scientific truth, but philosophical truth. Remember, I have already disclaimed the idea that science finds philosophical or metaphysical truth." [Emphasis added]
That hyperlink points back to "Three Myths About the Scientific Method", of which you should focus your attention on Myth #3.
You obviously either didn't read any of this, or you didn't understand it, or you deliberately chose to misrepresent it. Which is it?
That is not a rhetorical question. I expect an answer. If you don't provide one, I won't publish any more of your comments.